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Abstract 
 
Canada's greenhouse gas emissions have risen dramatically since the 
1997 negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, and that rise has continued through Canada's 2002 
ratification of the Protocol.  Constitutional barriers to regulation have 
sometimes been cited as the reason for caution in regulating 
greenhouse gases, as well as economic dislocation.  This article 
critically evaluates the constitutional arguments, and examines the 
policy considerations of various regulatory instruments that might be 
used to reduce greenhouse gases.  We conclude that the Canadian 
Constitution does not present any significant barriers to federal or 
provincial regulation, and that policy considerations strongly favour 
the use of two instruments: a federal carbon tax and use of the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act to review federal projects 
that may increase greenhouse gases.   
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I. Introduction 
 
In a 2007 speech to the Canadian Bar Association, former 
Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed warned of an impending 
constitutional crisis over the regulation of greenhouse gases.  A 
"major constitutional battle" was brewing between the federal 
government, which faces increasing international and domestic 
pressure to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases, and the 
government of Alberta, where high greenhouse emissions are 
produced by oil and gas development, a jealously-guarded provincial 
perogative.1  "Public pressure," in Lougheed's view, "is likely to force 
the passage of strong [federal] environmental legislation," while the 
economic forces driving oil sands development will likely lead to 
resistance from Alberta in the form of conflicting legislation.2   
 
Is there really a constitutional storm on the horizon?  
Lougheed's most memorable political legacy is his constitutional 
quarrel with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau over the National Energy 
Program, during which Lougheed challenged the federal 
government's authority to tax oil and gas production.  This experience 
may be colouring Lougheed's view.  Although there is tension 
between federal and provincial authority over the regulation of 
Canadian greenhouse gases, this tension need not be, and should not 
be, an obstacle to sensible greenhouse gas regulation. 
 
                                                 
 
1
  Const. § 92A(1). 
 
2
  Editorial, How to head off an oil-sands clash, GLOBE AND MAIL, August 
16, 2007; Kirk Makin, Clash over oil sands inevitable: Lougheed, THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL August 14, 2007. available online at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070814.wlougheed0814
/BNStory/robNews/; Peter Lougheed, Speech to Canadian Bar Association, 
Calgary, August 14, 2007.  The videorecording of the speech is available online at 
http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp=template&act=view3&pagetype=vod&la
ng=e&clipID=96 (last visited March 21, 2008). 
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II. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Canada 
 
Canada's greenhouse gas emissions have risen sharply since 
1990, the baseline year from which the commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol3 are derived, from 596 Mt in CO2-equivalents4 to 747 Mt in 
2005,5 the steepest rise of the G8 countries over this time period.6  It 
is now impractical for Canada to comply with its Kyoto commitment 
to lower its emissions to 563 Mt.7  Increases have been across almost 
all sectors – emissions from electricity generation, transportation, 
                                                 
 
3
  KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, December 10, 1997, Entered into force, 16 February 2005. 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998); 
reprinted in DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, TREATY SUPPLEMENT 120-134 (3d ed., 2007). 
 
4
  "Carbon dioxide-equivalents" is an index of total emissions from all six 
greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol, which include carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride.  The index is weighted by the heat-trapping effect of emissions of the 
different greenhouse gases, in comparison with the effect of a tonne of carbon 
dioxide.  For example, since methane has twenty-one times the heat-trapping power 
of carbon dioxide, emissions of methane are multiplied by twenty-one for purposes 
of calculating the index.  Also, in terms of emissions trading under Kyoto, 
emissions of methane will be deemed to be twenty-one times as important as the 
equivalent emissions of carbon dioxide. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Emission Fact: Metrics for Expressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Carbon 
Equivalents and Carbon Dioxide Equivalents, online at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/420f05002.htm.   
 
5
  Environment Canada, Canada's 2005 Greenhouse Gas Inventory, A 
Summary of Trends, fig. 1e, online at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2005/2005summary_e.cfm.   
 
6
  Canada’s increase in total aggregate greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 
to 2005 was the highest among G8 nations. Reuters, Canada Led G8 in Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Growth, April 23, 2008, online at 
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/48101/story.htm.  Canada 
ranked sixth among Annex I countries at 25.3%, behind Turkey, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland and Australia. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), National greenhouse gas inventory data for the period 1990-
2005 at page 9, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/sbi/eng/30.pdf. 
 
7
  Kathryn Harrison, “The Road not Taken: Climate Change Policy in 
Canada and the United States” (2007) 7.4 Global Environmental Politics 7.4 92 at 
113. Canada’s Kyoto Protocol commitment is to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions to 94% of its 1990 level of 596 Mt. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3 at 
Annex B. The Kyoto Protocol parties’ emissions for the years 1990 through 2006, 
as submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Secretariat, are available at 
http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty/Event.do;jsessionid=44137D9DF0E7A870A21
9F1F4602305BA.diprod01?event=go.  
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petroleum production, mining, agriculture, waste, and fugitive 
releases from natural gas production all increased between 1990 and 
2005.8  Only greenhouse gas emissions from industrial processes 
declined slightly over that time period.9  It no longer makes sense for 
Canada to unilaterally and immediately cease the upward momentum 
of emissions and begin an emissions reduction of more than 25% over 
the next four years. 
 
The general problem of greenhouse gas regulation pits Alberta 
against the rest of Canada.  Alberta emits nearly one-third of Canada's 
greenhouse gases,10 and its emissions have increased the most sharply 
of all the provinces, from approximately 173 Mt CO2-eq to 235 due 
mainly to its oil sands development.11  Although certain promising 
greenhouse gas control technologies are on the horizon, Alberta's 
juggernaut oil sands development will make it difficult for Alberta to 
contain its greenhouse gas emissions.  Politically, this cleave 
superficially appears either to preclude federal greenhouse gas 
emissions regulation, or to require a re-enactment of the federal-
provincial showdown that marred Canada's first attempt at an energy 
plan.  However, as this article argues, this overstates the potential for 
legal conflict in the regulation of greenhouse gases in Canada and 
overlooks many alternatives that are constitutionally sound, if 
politically challenging. 
 
A. Potential Regulatory Instruments 
 
While the many possibilities for greenhouse gas regulation 
have been treated extensively elsewhere, a brief review of the 
potential regulatory instruments would help to frame the discussion in 
the Canadian context.  Only the most frequently discussed types of 
                                                 
 
8
  Supra, note 5. 
 
9
  Ibid. 
 
10
  In 2005, Alberta emitted 235 Mt (Ibid.) out of Canada's 747 Mt (Ibid. at s. 
2.1).  
 
11
  Environment Canada, Canada's 2005 Greenhouse Gas Inventory, National 
Inventory Report 1990-2005: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, Table 
A11-18, 1990-2005 GHG Emission Summary for Alberta, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2005_report/ta11_18_eng.cfm. The 
energy sector (which includes oil sands activities) in Alberta increased its emissions 
from 148,000 to 200,00, a 52,000-ton increase that accounts for the bulk of 
Alberta's 62,000-ton increase overall. 
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schemes are included in this brief review, as a comprehensive 
treatment, which would necessarily involve scores of ideas, is beyond 
the scope of this article.   
 
Greenhouse gas regulation could take a traditional form of 
environmental regulation, sometimes referred to as "command and 
control" regulation, which typically contemplates some 
administrative standard that serves as a baseline for pollution control 
performance.  The standard could be fixed, specifying a numerical 
expression of performance, such as in the regulations governing 
chlor-alkali plants under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
which provide that "[t]he quantity of mercury that the owner or 
operator of a plant may release into the ambient air from that plant 
shall not exceed (a) 5 grams per day per 1,000 kilograms of rated 
capacity, where the source of the mercury is the ventilation gases 
exhausted from cell rooms…."12  Alternatively, a standard could be 
linked to industry practices and contain keywords that hint at how 
ambitious the polluter must be relative to the industry practice, such 
as "Best Available Technology Economically Achievable" 
(BATEA).13  The distinguishing feature of command-and-control 
                                                 
 
12
  Chlor-Alkali Mercury Release Regulations, P.C. 1990-242 15 February, 
1990, § 3(1)(a). 
 
13
  This was the language in a 2005 plan by the then-governing Liberal party 
mandating that new industrial facilities large enough to be considered "large final 
emitters" would, for the first ten years, have emissions targets based on the 
emissions rate obtainable by the industry (Department of the Environment, Notice 
of intent to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by Large Final Emitters, Canada 
Gazette, Part I, July 16, 2005 at p. 2494).  What exactly was meant by this 
terminology is unclear, though similar language in U.S. statutes suggests that the 
technology required would lie, somewhere between those technologies and 
techniques that are commonly available and those that are cutting-edge.  The U.S. 
Clean Air Act provides that when a new stationary source of air pollution (defined 
in the statute as certain "criteria air pollutants") is constructed or significantly 
modified, the facility must achieve the "lowest achievable emission rate" (Clean Air 
Act § 173(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2)) if it is located in a heavily polluted zone, 
and must install the "best available control technology" if it is located in a less 
polluted zone (Clean Air Act § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4)).  Existing 
stationary pollution sources must install "reasonably available control technology" 
if they are located in a heavily polluted zone. Clean Air Act § 172(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7502(c)(1).  In terms of stringency, "lowest achievable emissions rate" is the most 
stringent, and "reasonably available control technology" is the least stringent, with 
"best available control technology" somewhere in between.  See, Shi-Ling Hsu, The 
Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 Envtl. L. Rep. 10095 (2006). 
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systems is that compliance is a matter of whether an emitter has 
adopted the right technology or industrial practices, something that is 
determined administratively.  
 
In a marked break in philosophy with the traditional means of 
environmental regulation, "cap-and-trade" programs have gained 
popularity as a regulatory instrument.  Rather than defining 
compliance in terms of some administratively-set standards, cap-and-
trade programs involve the issuance of allowances to emitters that 
permit them to emit a quantity of pollution.  Compliance is thus 
determined solely by whether the emitter has enough allowances to 
cover its quantity of emissions.  Allowances can be traded, and 
economic theory predicts that the allowances will flow to their 
highest and best use – to those emitters for whom emissions reduction 
would be the most costly.  This has the effect of concentrating 
emissions reductions among those for whom emissions reduction 
would be cheapest, and thereby minimizing overall industry 
compliance costs.  Additionally, cap-and-trade programs are thought 
to spur innovation because the imposition of a cost on emissions 
should induce emitters to undertake a self-interested effort to find 
ways to reduce emissions.  Ideally, the total allowances issued would 
be fixed, producing a hard "cap," and allowances would be scarce 
enough to achieve a net decrease in emissions.  Cap-and-trade 
programs in the greenhouse gas context typically involve the issuance 
of allowances to emit some quantity of carbon or carbon dioxide. 
 
In the wake of concerns about the compliance costs of cap-
and-trade programs, a less effective alternative has emerged, one 
favoured by the last two Canadian federal governments: intensity-
based emissions trading.  Intensity-based emissions trading involves 
not hard and fixed caps, but moving caps that seek only to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions intensity, and not necessarily the absolute 
amount of emissions.  Under the intensity-based emissions trading 
programs proposed by Canadian governments, allowances are issued 
to emitters on the basis of their productive output, so any emitter that 
becomes more efficient in operations will be given more allowances.  
Because the cap is dependent upon productive output, and can be 
ratcheted up by the achievement of productive efficiencies, there is no 
hard and fixed emissions "cap" per se. 
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Similar in economic philosophy to cap-and-trade programs, 
Pigouvian taxes have long been popular among economists for 
addressing large-scale pollution problems,14 leading to the idea of a 
carbon tax surfacing in some policy debates.  A carbon tax is a 
payment based on the actual or anticipated quantity of carbon 
emissions released into the atmosphere.  In practice the tax is levied 
upon some point of sale involving a carbon-based product that is 
intended for combustion.15  The rationales behind Pigouvian taxation 
and cap-and-trade programs are the same: impose a marginal cost on 
emissions, and those that can most cheaply reduce emissions will do 
so.  The difference between taxation and cap-and-trade programs is 
that a cap-and-trade program is essentially a quantity instrument, 
while a taxation program is a price instrument; taxation programs 
offer a degree of certainty for emitters that the price of emissions will 
stay at a particular level, while cap-and-trade programs (if not riddled 
with political sweeteners) ensure a particular level of emissions, but 
only among those emitters covered by the cap-and-trade program.   
 
Finally, some regulation may be achieved by using an existing 
federal statute, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, or 
                                                 
 
14
 "Pigouvian" is meant to describe a tax that would be consistent with 
Pigou's prescription that a tax equal to the marginal social harm from pollution 
should be imposed to provide just the right amount of disincentive for pollution. 
Alfred C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 131-135 (1928).  Taxes that 
reflected the extent of negative externality thus became known as "Pigouvian" 
taxes. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL AND WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21-23 (2d ed., 1988).  Important economic texts that have 
argued for Pigouvian taxation include WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, 
THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23 (2d ed., Cambridge 1988) ("In sum . . 
. the proper corrective device is a Pigouvian tax equal to marginal social damage 
levied on the generator of the externality with no supplementary incentives for 
victims."); P.S. DASGUPTA & G.M. HEAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND EXHAUSTIBLE 
RESOURCES 52-54 (Cambridge 1979) (“Strictly from a formal point of view our 
example suggests that, as long as all costs in running an institution are nil, a tax 
equilibrium and a competitive equilibrium with markets for externalities are 
equivalent."); TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS 373 (3d ed. Harper-Collins 1992) ("We have shown as long as the 
control authority imposes the same emission charge on all sources, the resulting 
reduction allocation automatically minimizes the costs of control); PAUL 
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 744 (11th ed., McGraw-Hill 1980) ("Economists propose 
that greater use be made of pricing mechanisms. Taxes are to be put on firms and 
industries that put out effluents into the air and ground . . . ."). 
 
15
 See text accompanying notes 61-71, infra. 
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"CEA Act."  The CEA Act requires an environmental assessment for 
projects proposed by a federal authority or receiving financial 
assistance from a federal authority, or for any sale or lease of federal 
lands, or for any federal action or permitting that implicates an area of 
federal concern identified by regulation.16  The "environment" is 
construed broadly, encompassing "…air, including all layers of the 
atmosphere."17  The CEA Act already plays a powerful environmental 
role in requiring assessment of almost all significant federal projects, 
and might be deployed in a similar manner in requiring agencies to 
consider the greenhouse gas implications of federal projects, much as 
they already do for other environmental impacts.  This regulatory 
option is different from the other options, in that it is a procedural 
one, and not one that is aimed at achieving any substantive outcome. 
 
B. Federal Attempts at Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
 
In 2007, under intense international pressure, Prime Minister 
Harper finally dragged the Conservative Party into the climate change 
discussion, announcing an intention to reduce Canada’s total 
emissions of greenhouse gases to 20% below 2006 levels by the year 
2020, and by 60% below 2006 levels by 2050.18  The Conservative 
Party plan is an intensity-based emissions trading program, covering 
the most greenhouse gas-emitting industries, including the electricity 
generation, oil and gas, aluminum, cement, and pulp and paper 
industries.  Large19 facilities in existence before 2004 will have 2010 
reduction targets of 18% below 2006 levels, with 2% further 
reductions annually.20  "New facilities" (with a first year of operation 
after 2003) will be required to achieve intensity reductions of 2% 
                                                 
16
 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, s. 5(1). 
17
 Ibid., ss. 2(1) and 16(1). 
 
18
 Environment Canada, Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution, available online at 
http://www.ecoaction.gc.ca/news-nouvelles/20070426-eng.cfm.  
 
19
  The regulations for the plan, which will be finalized later in 2008, will 
apply to electricity generating facilities that have a capacity of ten megawatts or 
greater, to upsteam oil and gas facilities that emit 3 kilotonnes or have the capacity 
to process 10,000 barrels per day, and to facilities in the chemical sector, the 
nitrogen-based fertilizer sector, and to natural gas pipelines that emit a minimum of 
50 kilotonnes of carbon dioxide or the equivalent.  
 
20
  Ibid. 
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annually after the third year of operation.21  Oil sands facilities 
coming online after 2012 must install carbon capture and storage 
technology.22  As noted above, with intensity-based emissions trading 
programs, it is difficult to determine how much emissions reduction 
will actually take place, because the number of allowances is keyed to 
productive output.  And if there is economic pressure on output (as 
there clearly will be with a developing industry such as oil sands 
production), then improvements in productive efficiency will lead to 
the availability of more emissions allowances, thereby lifting the 
ceiling on emissions.   
 
Government projections of a 20% decrease from 2006 levels 
by the year 2020 are hard to evaluate, based as they are on a 
complicated macroeconomic model,23 but they do incorporate some 
assumptions that seem optimistic.  For example, the model assumes 
that, by the year 2020: despite the absence of federal regulation, 
passenger and freight transportation efficiency would, along with 
some questionably large gains in automobile efficiency, reduce 
emissions by 35 megatonnes from a business-as-usual forecast;24 the 
East-West transmission grid will be expanded to transport clean 
power across Canada,25 a project that will require considerable inter-
jurisdictional cooperation; contributions into a mysterious 
"Technology Fund" will somehow generate 20 megatonnes of 
emission reduction;26 and that offsets from the agricultural and 
forestry sectors – greenhouse gas-reducing actions that would not 
have otherwise been undertaken – would produce almost 50 
megatonnes of reduction.27  It is difficult to say whether these 
reductions will actually take place, but considering the fanfare with 
which the federal government has announced its intention to meet 
very explicit targets of greenhouse gas reductions of 20% by 2020 
                                                 
 
21
  Ibid. 
 
22
  Supra, note 18, at 3. 
 
23
 Environment Canada developed a model called the Energy-Economy-
Environment Model for Canada, which incorporates a variety of economic factors, 
many of which are global in nature.    
 
24
 Environment Canada, Turning the Corner: Detailed Emissions and 
Economic Modelling 9 (2008) available online at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-
corner/2008-03/pdf/571_eng.pdf. 
 
25
 Ibid at 28.  
 
26
 Ibid. at 6. 
 
27
 Ibid., at 11. 
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and 60% by 2050, these assumptions seem like a tenuous foundation 
upon which to make such specific claims. 
 
Despite mutual criticism between the Liberal and 
Conservative parties over greenhouse gas regulation, the current 
proposal bears an odd resemblance to a plan rolled out in 2005 by 
then-Prime Minister Paul Martin, in that it is an intensity-based 
emissions trading program that covered roughly the same set of seven 
hundred or so "large final emitters," and allowed contribution to a 
"Greenhouse Gas Technology Fund" to substitute for actually 
achieving the mandated emissions intensity improvements.28  If the 
current plan is, as opposition parties argue, insufficient,29 the previous 
2005 Liberal plan was delusional.  The only concrete part of the 
Liberal plan was the intensity-based emissions trading plan for large 
final emitters, which was projected to achieve only fifty-five 
megatons of emissions reduction, a mere one-fifth of the reductions 
required to comply with Kyoto.30  The remaining four-fifths of the 
emissions reductions were projected to occur as a result of a variety 
of ill-defined spending programs, such as the Greenhouse Gas 
Technology Fund.31  To put it bluntly, the Martin Plan consisted of a 
modest emissions trading plan and a collection of unsupported 
assertions about the effectiveness of spending money on undefined 
research projects. 
 
                                                 
 
28
 Environment Canada, Turning the Corner: Regulatory Framework for 
Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions 14 (2008) available online at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/pdf/541_eng.pdf.  
 
29
  Liberal Party Media Release, “Conservatives Give Large Polluters Free 
Ride” April 26, 2007, http://www.liberal.ca/story_12734_e.aspx. 
 
30
  Ibid. 
 
31
  The Plan included money for a "Climate Fund," in which the federal 
government would buy emissions credits through international trading; a 
"Partnership Fund," to fund joint government-private emissions reduction projects; 
production subsidies for renewable energy; a housing energy efficiency retrofit 
program, an energy-efficient vehicle purchase program; a "Green Municipal Fund" 
for cities to undertake emission reduction projects; and a "Sustainable Cities and 
Communities Fund," a transfer of federal gasoline taxes to cities to fund projects 
such as landfill gas capture, efficient community energy systems, solid waste 
management, and transit programs. [cite]  In a separate one-off agreement, the 
federal government obtained a promise from Canadian automakers to reduce their 
emissions by 3.9 percent by 2009, the only part of the Plan that contemplated an 
actual emissions reduction. 
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An interesting twist on the Martin plan is worth noting.  The 
emissions trading plan for large final emitters included a "safety 
valve" provision that guaranteed that the price of an allowance to 
emit a tonne of carbon dioxide would not exceed fifteen dollars 
during the 2008-2012 period.32  This provision came under heavy 
criticism, especially from environmental organizations, for limiting 
the amount of incentive that emitters would face to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.33   
 
Such safety valves are not new to environmental economics.34  
If the safety valve level is low enough, it sets the price of emissions 
and essentially creates a carbon tax,35 and, by most accounts, fifteen 
dollars per tonne is a low level, although as noted above, the fact that 
the program was intensity-based means that allowances could be 
plentiful enough to drive the price still lower.36  The interesting 
question is why would such an elaborate emissions trading plan with 
a safety valve be put in place, if the goal was essentially to tax 
emissions at a maximum of fifteen dollars per tonne?  Couldn't some 
sort of a tax scheme be devised to achieve the same thing, but in a 
much simpler fashion? 
 
                                                 
 
32
 Notice of Intent to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Large Final 
Emitters, Canada Gazette, 2005.I.716, July 16, 2005, available online at 
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2005/20050716/html/notice-e.html; Greenhouse 
Gas Technology Investment Fund Act, 2005, c. 5, s. 96 at s.8(5). 
 
33
 Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development, Moving Ahead on Large 
Final Emitters (LFEs), Briefing Note, December 2, 2004, available online at 
http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/LFE20041202_Brief_Moving_on_LFE.pdf.  
 
34
 Henry D. Jacoby and A. Denny Ellerman, The Safety Valve and Climate 
Policy, 323 ENERGY POLICY 481 (2004); Marc J. Roberts & Michael Spence, 
Effluent Charges and Licenses Under Uncertainty, 5 J. PUBL. ECON. 193 (1976); 
Willam A. Pizer, Prices vs. Quantities Revisited: the Case of Climate Change, 
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 98-02 (1997), available online at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-98-02.pdf.  
 
35
 Id, at 481. 
 
36
 As discussed above, supra, notes 219-229 and text accompanying, the 
European Union Emissions Trading System, was deemed a failure because the 
allowance prices dipped to below ten Euros on several occasions, frustrating 
attempts to induce investment in low-carbon technologies.  See, also, Jacoby and 
Ellerman, supra, note 34, at 484 (reviewing studies of .  British Columbia has 
introduced a carbon tax that starts at ten dollars per tonne and increases to thirty 
dollars per tonne over five years, suggesting that over the long run, thirty dollars is 
closer to an optimal tax level.  See, infra, text accompanying notes 67-69.   
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There are two answers to this question, one psychological and 
one political.  The psychological answer harkens back to the special 
aversion to all policies bearing the word "tax," especially in Alberta, 
where memories of the NEP remain fresh twenty-five years later, and 
especially if the federal government is involved.37  "Taxes" per se are 
so unpopular in North America, that influential economists have 
argued that a safety valve is a way of introducing a tax-like 
mechanism without necessarily introducing the "baggage" involved 
with emissions taxes.38 
 
But there is a political aspect to this question, pertaining to the 
level of the tax: how did the figure fifteen dollars per tonne come 
about?  The answer is not, as one might think, that it represented the 
acceptable level for those in Albertan oil and gas industries; fifteen 
dollars per tonne would have represented a tax of about $6.60 per 
barrel of oil,39 and a mere four cents per litre of gasoline – a cost that 
could almost invisibly be passed on the gasoline consumer.  It was 
not Alberta that insisted on this safety valve. 
                                                 
 
37
  Carbon Tax Proposal a Non-starter in Alberta, CBCNews.ca, January 8, 
2008, online at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgary/story/2008/01/08/renner-
carbon.html.  
 
38
 See, e.g., Jacoby and Ellerman, supra, note 34, at 485; Willam A. Pizer, 
Choosing Prices or Quantity Controls for Greenhouse Gases, Resources for the 
Future Climate Issues Brief No. 17 9 (1999), available online at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-CCIB-17.pdf ("...the advantages of a carbon 
tax can be achieved without the baggage of an actual tax.");  
 
39
  A carbon tax levied on production of a barrel of oil would measure the 
carbon content on a barrel, and could levy the tax against the producer.  The carbon 
content of crude oil is approximately 19.9 metric tonnes per terrajoule, or 0.0199 
tonnes per gigajoule.  A barrel of oil typically contains 6.1 gigajoules, so the carbon 
content of a barrel of oil is typically 0.12 tonnes.  The tax is on emissions of a tonne 
of carbon dioxide, which has a molecular weight of 44, as opposed to the molecular 
weight of carbon, which is 12.  Emitting 0.12 tonnes of carbon would thus be the 
same as emitting 0.44 tonnes of carbon dioxide.  With a tax of $15 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide, the tax on a barrel of oil would be about $6.60 per barrel.  There are 
42 U.S. gallons of gasoline to a barrel, so that this tax amounted to about fifteen 
cents per gallon of gasoline.  Figures are from Oak Ridge National Laboratories, 
Bioenergy Conversion Factors, online at 
http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/energy_conv.html.  World crude oil prices 
ranged from $35 per barrel to $60 per barrel in 2005.  U.S. Department of Energy, 
Energy Information Administration, All Countries Spot Price FOB Weighted by 
Estimated Export Volume, online at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm. 
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The answer can be found in those ridings in which the Liberal 
government was most afraid of losing in an imminent federal 
election: manufacturing-heavy, greenhouse gas-intensive ridings in 
Southern Ontario.  Pandering to Alberta would have done the Liberal 
party no good, but minimizing defection in Liberal ridings to the 
Conservative party was critical to preserving a Liberal minority 
government.  For example, the Anacaster-Dundas-Flamborough-
Westdale riding, home to the Carmeuse Lime production facility, 
which emitted over 600,000 tonnes of CO2 in 200440 (about three-
quarters of Ontario's lime production emissions41), saw very close 
races in 2004 and 2006: Liberal candidate Russ Powers narrowly 
defeated Conservative candidate David Sweet by 39% to 35% in 
2004, only to have those numbers reversed in a 2006 loss.42  In the 
extremely greenhouse gas-intensive riding of Sarnia-Lambton, 
facilities belonging to Cabot Canada, Imperial Oil, Suncor, BP 
Canada, TransAlta Energy, and NOVA Chemicals, emitted a reported 
total43 of over 4.75 Mt of CO2 in 200644 – almost five percent of all of 
Ontario's emissions – and saw a similar flip in a tight race, with 
Liberal MP Roger Gallaway narrowly winning in 2004 but losing to a 
Conservative in 2006.45  The Liberal Party did manage to hang on to 
their Mississauga South riding, home to Petro-Canada and St. 
Lawrence Cement plants, the source of another four million tonnes of 
CO2 emissions,46 but Liberal incumbent Paul Szabo's margin of 
victory shrunk from eighteen points in 2004 to less than four in 
2006.47   
                                                 
 
40
 Greenhouse gas emissions for individual facilities can be found online at 
Environment Canada, Information on GHG Sources, Facility GHG Reporting, at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/facility_e.cfm.  
 
41
 Environment Canada, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report, 1990-
2004: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, Annex 12, online at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2004_report/ta12_13_e.cfm.  
 
42
 2004 election results for Ontario ridings can be found online at CBC 
Canada Votes 2004, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2004/candidatesridings/ontario/index.html; 2006 
results can be found online at CBC Canada Votes 2006, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes/candidatesridings/ontario/index.html.  
 
43
 Not all facilities report their greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
44
 Supra, note 40. 
 
45
 Supra, note 42. 
 
46
 Supra, note 40. 
 
47
 Supra, note 42. 
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Politicians are particularly sensitive about talking about 
greenhouse gas regulation in Southern Ontario, because many 
industries are vulnerable to trade pressures, such as automobile 
manufacturing (both parts production and assembly), lime and cement 
manufacturing, and chemical manufacturing.  The suffering and high-
emitting automotive industry is always nervous about greenhouse gas 
regulation, particularly as Ontario is home to plants belonging to the 
most vulnerable automaker of all, General Motors.  The 2005 Liberal 
Plan, rather than imposing vehicle fuel efficiency regulations on the 
Canadian auto industry, instead entered into a memorandum of 
understanding with the industry, calling for a reduction of 5.3 
megatonnes per year by 2010.48  This was an unambitious target, 
given that road vehicles accounted for 135 megatonnes of greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2005.49  As for emissions from automotive 
manufacturing, it is again worth noting that some of the most 
competitive ridings, such as the St. Catherine's and Oshawa ridings,50 
are home to General Motors truck and car assembly plants.  The 
Oshawa plants together emitted about 275,000 tonnes of CO2 in 
2004,51 which would have meant an annual effective carbon tax bill 
of over four million dollars.  Such a sum is not fatal to such a large 
industry, but unwelcome in an economically distressed environment.   
 
Ontario also produces almost half of Canada's cement,52 forty 
percent of which is exported to the United States.53  In a highly 
competitive world market, added costs imposed upon Canadian 
cement manufacturers might affect their competitiveness, causing 
                                                 
 
48
 Natural Resources Canada, Automakers Agreement to Reduce GHG 
Emissions (2005), online at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/transportation/ghg-
memorandum/index.cfm.   
 
49
 Environment Canada, National Inventory Report, 1990-2005: Greenhouse 
Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, Table S-3, online at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2005_report/s2_eng.cfm#s2_3.  
 
50
 In 2004, Conservative Colin Carrie won the Oshawa riding by a less then 
one percent margin, and in 2006, Conservative Rick Dykstra won by 0.42%.  
Supra, note 42. 
 
51
 Supra, note 40. 
 
52
 Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, Cement Production 
and Quarrying in Ontario, online at 
http://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/mines/ogs/resgeol/rfe/commodity/cement.pdf.   
 
53
 Cement Association of  Canada, Cement Briefing Paper, undated (on file 
with author). 
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their world market share to fall.  A cement industry spokesperson 
reports that cement made in China is only slightly more expensive 
than that made in North America.  Curiously, the difference between 
Canadian cement and Chinese cement landing in Seattle is about $15 
per ton.54  Because the cement industry emits greenhouse gases at the 
rate of very roughly one tonne of carbon dioxide to one tonne of 
finished cement,55 a $15 dollar per ton tax on CO2 would exactly 
offset the competitive advantage currently enjoyed by Canadian 
cement manufacturers over their Chinese competitors.  Could this 
have been the source of the $15 per ton safety valve amount?  
Certainly, no government official or cement industry representative 
would admit to this, but the coincidence is curious. 
 
Throughout greenhouse gas-intensive and economically 
vulnerable Southern Ontario, the story seemed to be one of the 
Liberal Party in trouble and trying to hang on to seats in competitive 
ridings.  The safety valve, then, would seem to have been meant to 
protect Ontario manufacturing interests, not Alberta oil and gas 
interests, and to address a fear of losing manufacturing jobs to the 
U.S., which had no prospect at that time of greenhouse gas regulation.  
But Canadian public opinion, and Ontario public opinion, in 
particular, has never been as fearful of greenhouse gas regulation as 
federal politicians have been.  Greenhouse gas-intensive (and 
supposedly fearful) Ontario has joined, along with British Columbia 
and Manitoba, the Western Climate Initiative, a California-led state 
and provincial effort to reduce greenhouse gases.56  It always seems 
to be the case that the federal government has trailed public opinion 
and even industry opinion on greenhouse gas regulation.  In the 
greenhouse gas context, inter-regional politics seem to drive the 
federal government to the lowest common denominator in order to 
maintain a fragile hold on power.  While Canadian federalism would 
seem to present obstacles to greenhouse gas regulation, closer 
inspection reveals only political obstacles, and not necessarily 
accurately perceived ones at that.  
 
                                                 
 
54
 Personal email communication from Martin Vroegh, Environment 
Manager, St. Marys Cement Inc., to Patrick O'Brien, July 15, 2008 (on file with 
author). 
 
55
 Ibid. 
 
56
 See text accompanying note 73, infra. 
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C. Provincial Experiences with Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
 
While greenhouse gas policy has been a political football at 
the federal level, provinces have proceeded as if there were no 
prospect of federal-provincial conflicts at all.  Provinces have largely 
gone their own disparate ways in developing or not developing their 
own greenhouse gas policies.  In 1999, Alberta convened Climate 
Change Central (CCC), a climate change policy group composed of 
government and business interests to develop Alberta's policy 
response to Kyoto.  In 2002, Alberta announced its plan to reduce 
carbon intensity by fifty percent below 1990 levels by 2020.  Again, 
no actual emissions reduction was required, only an improvement in 
the rate of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of output.  The non-
profit Pembina Institute issued an analysis showing that the intensity 
targets were so lax that it would have allowed a 72% increase in 
emissions by 2020.57 
 
An updated plan was announced in 2007, which called for a 
new set of intensity targets to be met starting in 2010.58  The 
government of Alberta also announced that it would embark upon a 
program to fund carbon capture and storage, an end-of-pipe 
technology that captures carbon dioxide as it leaves the smokestack, 
and pipes it to underground caverns to be stored in perpetuity.59  
Generally sticking with its 2002 plan, Alberta projected that Alberta 
emissions in 2050 would be 14% lower than in 2005.  As did the 
federal government, the Alberta government more prominently 
announced that the 2050 emissions reductions would be 50% below 
business as usual levels,60 which certainly sounds better.  But that 
compares the emissions reduction with a projected upward trajectory 
                                                 
 
57
  http://www.pembina.org/media-release/1387.  
 
58
  The Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, SA 2003, c. C-16.7, 
s.3; Alberta Alta. Reg. 139/2007, ss. 3-4; Alberta Ministry of Environment, State of 
the Environment – Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intensity,  
Government of Alberta (June 20, 2007) online: 
http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/soe/climate_indicators/15_ghg.html.  
 
59
  Government of Alberta, Climate Change Plan, available online at 
http://alberta.ca/home/NewsFrame.cfm?ReleaseID=/acn/200801/22943ACC446ED
-ED74-6A1E-6CF263E59920969B.html.  
 
60
  Environment Alberta, Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy: 
Responsibility, Leadership, Action 5, January, 2008 available online at 
http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7894.pdf 
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of future emissions growth, essentially congratulating itself for 
diverging from its current profligacy. 
 
British Columbia and Quebec, which have implemented 
carbon taxes, have levied a carbon tax at the point of sale, in essence 
taxing the sale of a fossil fuel in the province.  This approach has 
many administrative advantages, as the wholesale purchase of fossil 
fuel is an easily trackable transaction, and therefore a convenient 
enforcement point.  In general, carbon taxes are administratively 
simpler to design and carry out than any emissions trading scheme, 
particularly an intensity-based scheme.   
 
The Quebec carbon tax applies to the distribution within the 
province of "gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, propane, petroleum 
coke or coal, but not aviation fuel, marine bunker fuel, hydrocarbons 
used as raw material by industries that transform hydrocarbon 
molecules through chemical or petrochemical processes or renewable 
fuel content…"61  The carbon tax is administered by the Regie de 
l’energie, the provincial energy regulatory agency, which determines 
the tax rate annually, taking into account "greenhouse gas emission 
reduction objectives … and the overall financial investment to be 
made to meet greenhouse gas emission reduction objectives and to 
carry out measures arising from any government policy or strategy 
that is designed to fight [and adapt to] climate change…."62  The 
actual levy paid by distributors of fossil fuels is determined at the end 
of the year by dividing the desired amount of "overall financial 
investment" into a "Green Fund" by the total amount of carbon 
emissions,63 and calculating each distributor's share of those 
emissions, taking into account the carbon content of different fossil 
fuels.64  Fossil fuels sold in Quebec are presumed to be intended for 
consumption in Quebec unless otherwise shown by the distributor.65  
Quebec's carbon tax took effect in November, 2007.66 
 
                                                 
61
 Government of Quebec, Regie de l’energie, Mission, http://www.regie-
energie.qc.ca/en/regie/mission.html, last updated March 3, 2008, s. 85.34. 
62
 Ibid, at s. 85.35. 
63
 Quebec O.C. 1049-2007, 28 November 2007, s. 1 
64
 Ibid. at s. 4. 
65
 Ibid. at s. 5. 
66
 Ibid. at s. 5. 
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British Columbia announced a carbon tax in February, 2008, 
which would be levied against the sale of all fossil fuels within the 
province, at the rate of $10 per tonne of carbon emissions (as 
measured by the carbon content), starting July 1, 2008.67  The tax 
increases by $5 per year to $30 per tonne in 2012.  For gasoline, the 
tax would amount to 2.41 cents per litre in 2008, increasing to 7.24 
cents per litre by 2012.  Diesel fuel and home heating oil would start 
at a tax of 2.76 cents per litre and rise to 8.27 cents by 2012.68  An 
important political piece of this plan was the stated intention to make 
the carbon tax revenue neutral, in that revenues from the tax would be 
returned somehow to B.C. individuals and firms.  Forecasted tax 
revenues seem to allow the Ministry to announce specific cuts in 
corporate, small business, and personal income tax rates, and lump 
sum payments.69  Notably, the lump sum payments and the personal 
income tax reductions are tilted towards lower-income British 
Columbians,70 to address perceptions that consumption-based taxes 
such as carbon taxes and gasoline taxes are regressive.71  
 
In addition, the British Columbia government has introduced a 
bill providing for a cap-and-trade program that will apply to 
greenhouse gas emitters within the province.72  Almost all of the 
pertinent details have been left to regulations, but this is 
understandable since the Province has committed to participate in a 
                                                 
 
67
 Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 2008 Legislative Sessions: 4th 
Session, 38th Parliament, Carbon Tax Act, Bill 37, First Reading, online at 
http://www.leg.bc.ca/38th4th/1st_read/gov37-1.htm, § 1(1), Table 1. 
 
68
  Ibid.   
 
69
  Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, B.C.'s Revenue-
neutral Carbon Tax, Backgrounder (2008), online at 
http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2008/backgrounders/2008_Backgrounder_Carbon_
Tax.pdf.  
 
70
 The "Climate Action Credit" provides an annual lump sum payment of 
$100 per adult and $30 per child, increasing in future years.  Backgrounder, at 2.  
Personal income tax rates will be reduced on the first $70,000 in earnings. Ibid. 
 
71
 Gasoline costs take up a larger proportion of a poor driver's paycheck than 
that of a rich driver, so the thinking goes, such that an increase would deprive 
poorer drivers of more basic goods than rich drivers.  The extent that poor drivers 
are just stuck, unable to substitute away from driving, appears to be more myth than 
empirical fact.  The actual determination of whether a gasoline tax is regressive or 
not is complicated.  For a further discussion, see note _x_, infra. 
 
72
  Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 2008 Legislative Sessions: 4th 
Session, 38th Parliament, Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act, Bill 18, 
First Reading, online at http://www.leg.bc.ca/38th4th/1st_read/gov18-1.htm.  
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California-led state-and-province greenhouse gas emissions trading 
reduction plan, the Western Climate Initiative,73 the details of which 
have not been finalized.  
 
Manitoba, which also joined the Western Climate Initiative, 
announced that it intends to legislate a commitment to meeting its 
share of Canada's Kyoto targets, a six percent reduction in 
greenhouse gases below 1990 levels.74  Unfortunately, Manitoba's 
plan, "Kyoto and Beyond,"75 seems predicated on some of the same 
creative accounting employed by the last two federal governments, 
one that measures emissions reduction in terms of its divergence from 
a "business as usual" baseline.  For example, Manitoba gives itself 
credit for 1.1 Mt of greenhouse gas reduction for construction of the 
Wuskwatim Hydro Generation Project, which will generate electricity 
for export out of the province.76  While this may be a laudable hydro 
project to meet increasing electricity demands, it is a bit self-serving 
to call construction of a dam an emissions "reduction." 
 
Also jumping on board with the Western Climate Initiative are 
the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, which penned their own bi-
provincial memorandum of understanding earlier this year, agreeing 
to agree on a cap-and-trade scheme between the two provinces.77  
While details are lacking, a joint initiative of the two most populous 
Canadian provinces is clearly a signal of widespread impatience with 
federal efforts.  Ontario's initiative also defies federal politicians' 
expectations that greenhouse gas regulation would be a political hot 
potato in that greenhouse gas-intensive manufacturing region. 
 
Curbing greenhouse gas emissions in Canada will obviously 
be challenging, as it will be for any industrialized country subject to 
                                                 
 
73
 http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/.  
 
74
 Government of Manitoba, News release, Beyond Kyoto Outlines 
Manitoba's Green Future: Rondeau, April 21, 2008, online at 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/press/top/2008/04/2008-04-21-100300-3541.html.  
 
75
 Government of Manitoba, Kyoto and Beyond: Meeting and Exceeding Our 
Kyoto Targets, available online at 
http://www.climatechangeconnection.org/Resources/documents/kyoto_plan.pdf.  
 
76
 Ibid., at 4. 
 
77
 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Ontario and 
the Government of Quebec, June 2, 2008, online at 
http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/news/Product.asp?ProductID=2281.  
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Kyoto targets.  But an overly cynical treatment of the greenhouse gas 
problem as a political football and the dubious use of "business as 
usual" baseline calculations are surely not helping matters.  This, and 
the perception that constitutional barriers exist, are unnecessary 
obstacles to the formation of Canadian greenhouse gas regulation.  
British Columbia and Quebec have certainly taken a lead in 
greenhouse gas regulation, but the magnitude of greenhouse gas 
reductions required of Canada necessitates a federal response, and 
one that is considerably more serious than any proposed to date. 
 
III. The Constitutional Dimension 
 
The validity under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 of legislation enacted by the federal and provincial orders of 
government to regulate greenhouse gas emissions will depend on a 
number of factors.78 One of those, obviously, is the precise nature of 
the legislation enacted. Some kinds of legislation will be easier to 
defend than others. For example, there is little reason to doubt that the 
federal order of government has the power under s. 91(3) to enact 
legislation imposing a carbon tax. Another factor is the extant body of 
jurisprudence governing the scope and meaning of the various heads 
of federal and provincial power in sections 91 and 92 upon which the 
two orders of government would be expected to rely in support of 
their legislation. In the case of some of the relevant heads of power – 
Parliament’s power to legislate for the “Peace, Order and Good 
Government of Canada” (hereinafter “POGG”), for example - the 
courts have formulated reasonably comprehensive definitions or tests. 
In the case of others – the provincial legislatures’ power to legislate 
                                                 
78
 The jurisdictional question addressed in this part of the paper has been 
discussed in one form or another by a number of authors already: see, e.g., Rolfe, 
C., “Turning Down the Heat: Emissions Trading and Canadian Implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol,” (Vancouver: West Coast Environmental Law Research 
Foundation, 1998); Castrilli, J.F., “Legal Authority for Emissions Trading in 
Canada,” in The Legislative Authority to Implement a Domestic Emissions Trading 
System (Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 
1999) App. 1; Barton, P., “Economic Instruments and the Kyoto Protocol: Can 
Parliament Implement Emissions Trading Without Provincial Co-operation?” 
(2002), 40 Alta. L. Rev. 417; and Bankes, N. and A.R. Lucas, “Kyoto, 
Constitutional Law and Alberta’s Proposals,” (2004), 42 Alta. L. Rev. 355. It 
should be noted that the conclusions reached by these various authors in relation to 
the specific issues they considered were far from unanimous. 
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in relation to “Property and Civil Rights in the Province,” for 
example – the understanding we have of their scope and meaning is 
based on a series of decisions rendered over a long period of time that 
tell us which kinds of “matters” come within the head of power and 
which do not. In either case, judges often have a good deal of room in 
which to maneuver when called upon to apply the extant 
jurisprudence in a specific case. That is more likely to be true if the 
impugned legislation is of a novel kind. 
 
A third factor is the set of analytical tools the courts have 
created to assist them in determining how particular legislative 
enactments are to be characterized for division of powers purposes, 
and the manner in which those tools would be used in the context of 
challenges to particular legislative enactments. That characterization 
process – the determination of the impugned legislation’s true 
“matter” or “pith and substance” – is absolutely critical to the 
outcome of a constitutional attack on division of powers grounds. The 
parties to the challenge will each advance one or more 
characterizations that, in their view, will improve their chances of 
obtaining, if not guarantee, a favourable result. While the tools judges 
use to make that determination do serve to constrain the choices 
available to them in this regard, those tools are nevertheless 
sufficiently malleable to leave judges with a great deal of room to 
maneuver in many cases. Again, that is more likely to be true if the 
impugned legislation is of a novel kind. 
 
A fourth factor is the attitude that the judiciary will bring to 
bear on the task of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation in this 
area. It is this factor that will influence the choices judges make in 
exercising the discretion they have in such cases. The judicial 
attitudes that will matter most are attitudes towards Canadian 
federalism, both generally and in the specific context of 
environmental protection, and, more particularly, the goals 
underlying attempts to reduce or at least control the level of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Some judges can be expected, either 
generally or in this specific context, to have centralist leanings, others 
to have provincialist leanings, and still others to be agnostic and 
therefore receptive to both orders of government being able to 
legislate in this area. Receptivity to both orders legislating in the area 
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will likely be enhanced by an acceptance of the importance of the 
goals underlying such attempts. 
 
The fact that the validity of legislation depends on so many 
factors means that, even if one knows exactly what legislation one is 
dealing with, confident predictions are often difficult to make. That is 
even more likely to be true if one is discussing in the abstract the 
question of which order of government can enact a particular kind of 
statute to deal with a social or economic problem, as we are here. 
Hence, while we will be making a number of predictions about the 
likelihood of certain kinds of legislative initiatives being open to the 
two orders of government in this paper, we do not want to be taken as 
having committed ourselves unreservedly to those views. 
 
We begin with three general observations about the manner in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada has tended to approach the task 
of reviewing on federalism grounds legislation designed to protect the 
environment. The first is that the Court has made it clear that the 
power to protect the environment does not reside exclusively with 
either Parliament or the provincial legislatures. As Justice LaForest 
put it on behalf of eight members of the Court in Friends of the 
Oldman River Society v. Canada,79 “… the Constitution Act, 1867 has 
not assigned the matter of ‘environment’ sui generis to either the 
provinces or Parliament. The environment, as understood in its 
generic sense, encompasses the physical, economic and social 
environment touching several of the heads assigned to the respective 
levels of government.”80 Justice LaForest in fact went so far in that 
case as to say that the environment in this broad sense was “a 
constitutionally abstruse matter which does not comfortably fit within 
the existing division of powers without considerable overlap and 
uncertainty.”81  
 
The jurisprudence makes it clear that this connection to heads 
of power on both sides of the federal-provincial divide is present even 
if the word “environment” is understood in more limited terms to 
mean the physical environment alone. Hence, the courts have upheld 
                                                 
79
 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 
80
 Ibid., at p.63. 
81
 Ibid., at p. 64. 
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as valid both federal82 and provincial83 legislation designed to protect 
the physical environment. They have been able to do that in part 
because they have shown a willingness to permit Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures to rely in support of such legislation on their 
respective jurisdictions over both some of the causes and some of the 
effects of polluting activities.84 For example, Parliament can regulate 
the polluting activities of interprovincial railways because it has 
jurisdiction over “…railways…connecting [one] province with any 
other or others of the provinces…” under s. 92(10)(a). It can also 
regulate polluting activities that harm the fisheries85 and the waters of 
the territorial sea86 because it has jurisdiction over “seacoast and 
inland fisheries” and the territorial sea under s. 91(12) and the POGG 
power respectively. Similarly, it is generally understood that the 
provincial legislatures can regulate the polluting activities of the 
mining and manufacturing industries because they have jurisdiction 
over the business activities of those industries under “property and 
civil rights” in s. 92(13).87 Provincial legislatures can also regulate 
polluting activities that harm provincial Crown lands and inland 
waterways because they have jurisdiction over such lands and 
waterways under s. 92(5) and 92(13) and/or (16) respectively.88 
 
                                                 
82
 See, e.g., R. v. Crown Zellerbach, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (using POGG) and R. 
v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (using s. 91(27)) 
83
 See, e.g., R. v. Lake Ontario Cement Ltd., [1973] 2 O.R. 247 (using s. 92(13) 
and (16) together). 
84
 The term “effects” in this context is intended to refer to jurisdiction over the 
place, entities or activities that suffer the environmental damage caused by the 
polluting activity in question. 
85
 Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292. 
86
 All seven of the judges in R. v. Crown Zellerbach, supra., note 82, agreed 
with this proposition in obiter. 
87
 See Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law of Canada, Constitutional Law of 
Canada (2007 Student Edition, Thompson Carswell), chapter 30.7. The use of this 
head of power to sustain provincial legislation regulating industries such as these is 
a function of the early jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, notably in cases like A.-G. Canada v. A.-G. Alberta (The Insurance 
Reference), [1916] 1 A.C. 589 and Reference re The Board of Commerce Act, 1919, 
[1922] 1 A.C. 191.  
88
 There is no direct authority in support of this proposition that we are aware 
of, but it can in our view be said to be implicit in the approach taken to the division 
of legislative authority over the environment in the majority reasons for judgment 
in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada, supra, note 82. 
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The courts’ willingness to approach questions about the 
validity of environmental protection legislation in this manner 
contributes in an important way to the “considerable overlap” of 
federal and provincial legislation in this area noted by Justice 
LaForest in Oldman River. The same polluting activities can, in 
theory, be regulated by both orders of government, one on the basis 
of its jurisdiction over the cause of those activities, and the other on 
the basis of its jurisdiction over the entities or places experiencing 
their effects. For example, a shipping company whose routes take it 
into waters that feed into local waterways can at one and the same 
time be subject to federal legislation (enacted under s. 91(10)) and 
provincial legislation (enacted under s. 92(13) and/or (16)).89 Only if 
the provincial enactment can be said to conflict with the federal and 
thereby trigger the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy 
– not an easy hurdle to meet, even under the Supreme Court’s new 
approach to that doctrine90 - will the shipping company be able to 
avoid the application of the former. 
 
The second observation is that the Supreme Court has been 
willing to permit Parliament to regulate certain kinds of polluting 
activities under its POGG  and criminal law (s. 91(27)) powers even 
though it has had to push the doctrinal envelopes governing those two 
heads of power in order to do so. In R. v. Crown Zellerbach,91 
decided in 1988, the Court upheld the federal Ocean Dumping Act92 
on the basis of the national concern branch of the POGG power in 
spite of the fact that, as the dissenting judges pointed out,93 marine 
                                                 
89
 This assumes, of course, that the provincial legislation is directed at the 
protection of the local waterways rather than at the polluting activities of ships per 
se. 
90
 See Elliot, R., “Safeguarding Provincial Autonomy from the Supreme 
Court’s New Federal Paramountcy Doctrine: A Constructive Role for the Intention 
to Cover the Field Test?” (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 629. 
91
 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401. 
92
 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 55. 
93
 There were three dissenting judges in this case, Justices Beetz, Lamer and 
LaForest. Their reasons for judgment, authored by Justice LaForest, placed 
particular emphasis on the significant negative impact that sustaining the Act on the 
basis of the national concern doctrine would have on provincial jurisdiction over 
the area in question (here, environmental protection), arguably the most important 
consideration the courts are required to take into account when asked to uphold 
federal legislation under that rubric. (See Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 
S.C.R. 373.) 
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pollution, the “matter” attributed to the Act, arguably lacked the 
characteristics required of legislation sustained under that rubric. And 
in R. v. Hydro-Quebec,94 decided in 1997, it upheld under s. 91(27) 
the toxic substances provisions of the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act95 in spite of the fact that, again as the dissenting judges 
pointed out,96 those provisions looked to be far more regulatory than 
prohibitory in nature.97 Taken together, these two decisions can be 
said to reflect a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court of 
Canada to use the room to maneuver that the doctrine in this area 
leaves them with to afford the federal order of government broad 
authority to protect the physical environment. They also reflect a high 
degree of sympathy on the Court’s part for the goal of environmental 
protection.  
 
Hydro-Quebec can also be said to reflect a growing preference 
on the Court’s part for permitting both orders of government to 
legislate in furtherance of that goal. Justice LaForest, who authored 
the majority reasons in that case, defended his use of s. 91(27) to 
validate C.E.P.A.’s toxic substances provisions at least in part on the 
ground that, unlike the national concern branch of POGG, which had 
been advanced as an alternative basis upon which to sustain those 
provisions, “The use of the federal criminal law power in no way 
precludes the provinces from exercising their extensive powers under 
s. 92 to regulate and control the pollution of the environment either 
independently or to supplement federal action.”98 In other words, by 
upholding those provisions on the basis of s. 91(27), the Court would 
in no way restrict the ability of the provincial legislatures, using the 
array of weapons available to them, to enact legislation protecting the 
environment. 
 
                                                 
94
 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213. 
95
 R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.). 
96
 The dissenting judges were Chief Justice Lamer and Justices Sopinka, 
Iacobucci and Major. Their reasons for judgment were co-authored by Chief Justice 
Lamer and Justice Iacobucci. 
97
 The test that federal legislation has to meet in order to qualify as criminal 
law under s. 91(27) includes the requirement that the legislation be prohibitory in 
character. (See Reference re s. 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Margarine 
Reference), [1949] S.C.R. 1.) It is worth noting that the majority in Hydro-Quebec 
accepted that that was the governing test. 
98
 Supra., note 94, at para. 131. 
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Thirdly, the law is clear that the power to enact legislation in 
implementation of obligations undertaken by the Government of 
Canada in an international treaty or convention does not fall to 
Parliament simply because the legislation has been enacted for that 
purpose. As Lord Atkin of the Privy Council put it in the Labour 
Conventions99 case, “For the purposes of ss. 91 and 92,… there is no 
such thing as treaty legislation as such.”100 Jurisdiction to enact 
legislation to implement treaty obligations rests with the order of 
government that has jurisdiction to legislate in relation to the subject 
matter of those obligations. The federal order cannot therefore claim 
jurisdiction to enact legislation regulating greenhouse gas emissions 
on the basis that such legislation is being enacted in fulfillment of 
Canada’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
That said, there is support in the jurisprudence for the notion 
that the fact that federal legislation has been enacted to implement 
treaty obligations might assist the federal government’s cause if that 
legislation were to be subjected to attack on federalism grounds, at 
least if the subject matter of the treaty can be said to relate to a matter 
of “predominantly extra-provincial as well as international character 
and implications.”101 That language comes from the majority reasons 
for judgment of Justice LeDain in Crown Zellerbach, in which, as 
noted above, the Supreme Court upheld the federal Ocean Dumping 
Act102 on the basis of the national concern branch of POGG. That 
statute had been enacted in fulfillment of Canada’s obligations under 
the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter,103 and Justice LeDain’s description of the 
subject matter of that treaty as being of “predominantly extra-
provincial as well as international character and implications” 
appeared to be a significant factor in his reasoning process. Given 
that the Kyoto Protocol clearly deals with a matter fitting that 
description, there is reason to believe that federal legislation 
                                                 
99
 [1937] A.C. 326. 
100
 Ibid., at p. 17. 
101
 R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., supra., note 82, at p. 436. 
102
 S.C. 1974-75-76. c. 55. 
103
 The Ocean Dumping Act went further in terms of its reach than the treaty 
required Canada to go. It applied to internal marine waters as well as the territorial 
sea and other external marine waters. It did not, however, apply to inland waters. 
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regulating greenhouse gas emissions would be on stronger ground 
than it might otherwise be because of its connection to that treaty. 
 
A. Provincial Jurisdiction 
 
We consider here the question of whether or not the provincial 
legislatures have the requisite constitutional authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions through the vehicles of (a) a carbon tax, (b) 
a cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regime, and (c) a command-
and-control regime 
 
1. Carbon Taxes 
 
The power of the provincial legislatures to tax is prescribed by 
s. 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in the following terms: “Direct 
Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for 
Provincial Purposes.” Those terms suggest that, in order for 
provincial legislation to be sustained on the basis of s. 92(2), the 
legislation must (a) impose a “tax,” which tax must (b) be “direct,” 
(c) be imposed “within the province,” and (d) be imposed “in order to 
the raising of a revenue for provincial purposes.”  
 
Given the manner in which requirements (a), (b) and (c) have 
come to be understood, there is little doubt that provincial legislation 
imposing a carbon tax of the kind that we have discussed above 
would be held to impose a “tax,” and that that “tax” would be held to 
be both “direct” and imposed “within the province.” The monies paid 
under such legislation would clearly satisfy the definition of a “tax” 
for this purpose. Equally clearly, they would not have the character of 
charges levied for the use of public property, or of fees levied to help 
pay for the costs of administering a regulatory scheme, both of which 
have been held not to qualify as “taxes.”104 On the assumption that it 
was levied against consumers of the products in question in respect of 
the particular units of those products that those consumers purchase, 
as the carbon tax in British Columbia is,105 that tax would be held to 
                                                 
104
 See Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law of Canada, supra., note 87, chapter 
31.10 for a discussion of the relevant jurisprudence. 
105
 Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. ---, ss. 8 – 13. 
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be a “direct” tax.106 Such a tax is in the nature of a sales tax levied 
against consumers, which the courts have long accepted to be direct 
taxes.107 And the tax would be held to be levied “within the province” 
because the only consumers required to pay it would likely be those 
who either purchase and consume the product in the province in 
which the tax is levied, or, as residents of or businesses operating 
within that province, purchase it elsewhere and bring the product into 
the province for consumption there.108 
 
This leaves us with requirement (d) – that the tax be levied “in 
order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.” On the 
face of it, that language would appear to provide the basis for a 
challenge to a provincial carbon tax that is revenue neutral, like the 
tax imposed by the Legislature of British Columbia.109 Can it not be 
argued that a tax that is advertised as being, and is required by the 
legislation imposing it to be, revenue neutral has not been levied “in 
order to the raising of a revenue”? And if the tax has not been levied 
for that purpose, can it not be said that the legislation imposing it 
exceeds provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(2)? 
 
This argument would not rest on the text of s. 92(2) alone. In 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, attempts were made on two 
occasions by provincial governments to persuade the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council that temperance legislation fell 
within provincial legislative jurisdiction under s. 92(9) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. Section 92(9) authorizes provincial 
legislatures to legislate in relation to “Shop, Saloon, Tavern, 
Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue 
for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes.” It is clear from the 
language of s. 92(9) that such an argument had very little to commend 
it, and, as one would expect, the Privy Council rejected it summarily 
in both cases. What is interesting for our purposes is that the 
reasoning given in support of rejecting it in the first of those cases, 
                                                 
106
 The definition of a “direct tax” adopted by the courts is a tax that is levied 
against the very persons expected to bear the burden of it. For a general discussion 
of this distinction and the relevant jurisprudence, see Hogg, P.W., Constitutional 
Law of Canada, supra., note 87, chapter 31.2.  
107
 See Hogg, P.W., ibid., chapter 31.7. 
108
 Ibid., chapter 31.11. 
109
 See ss. 3 – 7 of the Carbon Tax Act, supra., note 105. 
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Russell v. The Queen,110 included the following passage: “…the 
power of granting licences is not assigned to the Provincial 
Legislatures for the purpose of regulating trade, but ‘in order to the 
raising of a revenue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes.’ The 
Act in question is not a fiscal law; it is not a law for raising 
revenue….”111 It is clear from that passage that the Privy Council was 
prepared to give substantive content to language in s. 92(9) that is 
very similar to that found in s. 92(2). In order to fall within s. 92(9), 
the Privy Council effectively held, provincial legislation has to have 
been enacted for the purpose of raising revenue. If that is the way in 
which s. 92(9) has been understood, why would s. 92(2) not also be 
understood in that way? 
 
Finally, there is the decision of the Privy Council in a case 
known as the Alberta Bank Taxation Reference.112 At issue in that 
case was the validity of a tax imposed on banks by the Social Credit 
government of Alberta shortly after it had come to power in the mid-
1930’s. It had previously been established by the Privy Council in 
Bank of Toronto v. Lambe113 that provincial legislatures were not 
barred from imposing a special kind of tax on an industry whose 
business activities, like those of banks, fell within federal legislative 
jurisdiction.114 The mere fact that this Alberta tax had been levied 
solely against banks was therefore not fatal to its validity. 
Nevertheless, the tax was struck down. It was the view of the Privy 
Council that the real purpose of the tax was not to raise revenue from 
banks but to eliminate them from Alberta, and that the legislation 
imposing it was therefore, in pith and substance, banking legislation 
rather than taxation legislation. The clear implication of that decision 
is that, even if a provincial tax does raise additional revenues, that tax 
will not be sustained under s. 92(2) if it is characterized as having 
                                                 
110
 (1882), 7 A.C. 829. The other case was A.-G. Ontario v. A.-G. Canada (The 
Local Prohibition Reference), [1896] A.C. 348. In that case, the Privy Council 
relied on its prior holding in Russell. 
111
 Ibid., at p. 837. 
112
 [1939] A.C. 117. The decision in that case has been considered in at least 
two other cases, C.P.R. Co. v. A.-G. of Saskatchewan, [1951]} 4 D.L.R. 21 (Sask. 
C.A.) and Cosyns v. A.-G. of Canada, (1992) 7 O.R. (3d) 641 (Div. Ct.), but in 
neither of those cases did it form the basis of the decision. 
113
 (1887), 12 A.C. 575. 
114
 Section 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gives Parliament exclusive 
jurisdiction over “Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money.” 
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been enacted in relation to a matter falling within a head of power in 
s. 91. This suggests that the “in order to the raising of a revenue” 
language imposes a substantive requirement: only if the real purpose 
of the tax is to raise revenue will the tax qualify under s. 92(2).  
 
In spite of the textual and doctrinal support for this argument, 
there is no guarantee that the courts would find it persuasive. While it 
is true that the Privy Council in Russell gave substantive content to 
the “raising of a revenue” language in s. 92(9), the practical 
consequences of that interpretation were exceedingly limited in 
scope. All it meant was that legislation regulating (or prohibiting) the 
retail trade in liquor could not be anchored in that particular head of 
power. It did not mean that the provincial legislatures were barred 
from enacting such legislation. In fact, the Privy Council held in 
Hodge v. The Queen,115 decided within a year of Russell, that the 
provincial legislatures could regulate the retail trade in liquor under 
the combination of ss. 92(8), (15) and (16), and also held in the Local 
Prohibition Reference, decided in 1896, that they could prohibit that 
trade under either s. 92(13) or s. 92(16). By contrast, the 
consequences of interpreting “in order to the raising of a revenue” 
within the context of s. 92(2) as imposing a firm requirement that an 
impugned tax augment provincial coffers might well mean that 
provincial legislatures were barred from enacting revenue neutral 
taxes. That is something that, for understandable reasons, the courts 
might be very reluctant to do. Provided that provincially levied taxes 
satisfy the requirements of being “direct” and “within the province” – 
requirements that serve the important goal of helping to ensure that 
provincial legislatures are constrained in their ability to tax people to 
whom they are not democratically accountable - the tools by which 
provincial governments choose to raise the revenues they need, and 
the balance they strike between and amongst those tools, is a matter 
best left to the democratic process. It is not a matter over which the 
courts should have control. Moreover, a substantive reading of the 
language in s. 92(2) would create practical problems for the courts 
that they might wish to avoid. How can the courts be sure that a 
particular tax is in fact going to be revenue neutral? Or, putting it in 
slightly different terms, how revenue neutral does a tax have to be in 
order to fall afoul of the rule? And is a description of the tax as being 
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revenue neutral when it is first introduced by the government in the 
legislative assembly a requirement or just relevant evidence?  
 
Finally, as a technical matter, the fact that the enactment of a 
new tax will result in other taxes being reduced by an amount 
equivalent to the amount raised by the new tax does not mean that the 
new tax is not raising revenue. It clearly is raising revenue. Were it 
not, there would be no reason to reduce the amount raised by the old 
taxes. In fact, under the new regime, all of the taxes in question will 
be raising revenues. It is simply that the old taxes will be raising less 
revenue than they formerly did. 
 
In our view, while an argument that provincially imposed 
taxes that are designed to be, and are in fact, revenue neutral cannot 
be sustained by s. 92(2) is certainly plausible, it is likely that, if such 
an argument were to be advanced in a constitutional attack upon a 
carbon tax like that imposed by the Legislature of British Columbia, 
it would fail. We believe that the courts would find the weaknesses of 
that argument to outweigh its strengths, and moreover, that they 
would be right to do so.  
 
In the result, then, it is our opinion that provincially created 
carbon taxes would be held to fall within the scope of s. 92(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, and therefore be upheld as valid. 
 
2. Cap-and-Trade/Intensity-Based Trading Regimes 
 
The validity of a provincially created cap-and-trade or 
intensity-based trading regime would depend to a very considerable 
degree on the form it took, with the controlling factor being the 
entities to which the regime applied. If the regime were to be limited 
to business undertakings that the provincial legislatures have the 
authority to regulate qua businesses under any or all of s. 92(5),116 s. 
92(10),117 s.92(13)118 and s. 92A,119 there is good reason to believe 
                                                 
116
 “The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province 
and of the Timber and Wood thereon.” 
117
 “Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following 
Classes:- (a) Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and 
other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of 
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that it would be upheld as valid. If, however, it were not to be so 
limited, and were made applicable by its terms to business 
undertakings that fall within federal legislative jurisdiction, there is 
good reason to believe that it would be held to be invalid, at least 
insofar as its application to those undertakings is concerned.  
 
It is trite law that the power to regulate business activities in 
Canada resides presumptively with the provincial legislatures under s. 
92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which grants to those 
legislatures exclusive jurisdiction in respect of “Property and Civil 
Rights in the Province.” The theory on which that law is based, which 
can be traced back to the decisions of the Privy Council in the early 
years of our existence, is that the freedom to engage in the business 
activity of one’s choice (and to engage in that activity in the manner 
of one’s choice) is a “civil right.”120 Hence, legislation that in any 
way restricts that freedom – which all legislation regulating business 
activities, through licensing and other regimes, will do to some extent 
– is presumptively legislation in relation to “civil rights.” That 
presumption is, however, a rebuttable one, and it will be overcome by 
textually based grants to Parliament of legislative authority over the 
business activities of particular industries. Hence, it is clear that 
Parliament has jurisdiction to regulate the business activities of postal 
services (s. 91(5)), shipping companies (s. 91(10)), those engaged in 
                                                                                                                 
Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country: (c) Such Works as, 
although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution 
declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage of Two or 
more of the Provinces.” 
118
 “Property and Civil Rights in the Province.” 
119
 This head of power, which was added to the list of provincial powers by the 
Constitution Act, 1982, is not being reproduced verbatim because it is a very 
lengthy one with numerous subsections. For our purposes, what is significant about 
it is that it grants to the provincial legislatures power over the development and 
management of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical 
energy. 
120
 See A.-G. Canada v. A.-G. Alberta (The Insurance Reference), [1916] 1 
A.C. 589, in which Lord Haldane spoke of the federal legislation there at issue, 
which regulated large insurance companies, as “depriv[ing] private individuals of 
their liberty to carry on the business of insurance” (at p. 595). Later in his 
judgment, he says “it must now be taken that the authority to legislate for the 
regulation of trade and commerce [in s. 91(2)] does not extend to the regulation of a 
licensing system of a particular trade in which Canadians would otherwise be free 
to engage in the provinces” (at p. 596). 
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seacoast and inland fisheries (s. 91(12)), banks (s. 91(15)), savings 
banks (s. 91(16)), and interprovincial transportation and 
communication undertakings (s. 92(10) and s. 91(29)). As a result of 
judicial decisions defining the scope of Parliament’s POGG power, it 
is also now clear that Parliament has jurisdiction to regulate the 
business activities of those involved in the aeronautics121 and nuclear 
power generation122 industries. And as a result of judicial decisions 
defining the scope of s. 91(2), it is clear that Parliament has 
jurisdiction to regulate international and interprovincial trade as well 
as to legislate in respect of “general trade affecting the whole 
Dominion,”123 a carefully circumscribed source of power pursuant to 
which Parliament has been able to legislate in the areas of 
competition policy124 and trademarks.125 
 
The industries that fall within provincial jurisdiction under 
this arrangement are numerous, and include many of the industries 
that emit large amounts of carbon into the atmosphere and are 
therefore good candidates for a cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime – oil and gas, manufacturing, mining, forestry, construction, 
intraprovincial truck and bus lines, etc. Moreover, the power of the 
provincial legislatures to regulate the business activities of those 
industries has been understood broadly by the courts. In particular, it 
has been held to permit them to regulate those activities for a range of 
different purposes – to protect consumers from fraudulent dealings, to 
protect the health and safety of consumers, to establish quality 
standards, to ensure adequate supply and to protect the economic and 
other interests of employees.126 It has also been held to permit them to 
regulate those activities for the purpose of protecting the 
environment.127 There is every reason to believe, therefore, that 
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 Johannesson v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292. 
122
 Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327. 
123
 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, (1881), 7 A.C. 96.  
124
 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
641. 
125
 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302. 
126
 The relevant jurisprudence is discussed in Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law 
of Canada, supra., note 87, chapter 21, especially 21.5 – 13. 
127
 This seems clearly implicit in the majority reasons of Justice LaForest in 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada, supra., note 79, in particular in his 
reference to provincial power over “local works and undertakings” as a source of 
provincial jurisdiction over environmental protection.. 
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provincial legislation establishing a cap-and-trade/intensity-based 
trading regime that is limited in its scope to such undertakings would 
be upheld as valid. 
 
The only reservation we have stems from the fact that the 
environment that such a regime would be seeking to protect is not 
limited to the environment of the province in which the regime 
operates. It is, rather, the global environment. Does that feature of 
such regimes render them constitutionally suspect? We think not. 
While the courts have shown themselves to be wary of permitting 
provincial legislatures to legislate in ways that create significant 
negative spillover effects in other provinces,128 there is little if any 
reason to suspect that they would be wary of permitting them to 
legislate in ways that create positive spillover effects in other 
provinces. Moreover, there seems little reason to doubt that provincial 
legislatures that create such regimes do so primarily to benefit future 
generations of residents of the provinces for which they have 
responsibility. It is their own residents’ future wellbeing to which 
such regimes are primarily directed.  
 
Would it be open to a provincial legislature to extend the 
reach of a cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regime to include 
industries that normally fall within federal legislative jurisdiction, 
such as aeronautics, international/interprovincial truck and bus lines 
and nuclear power generation? Given the nature of such regimes, 
extending their reach in this way could only be accomplished by 
specifically including such industries in the list of industries to which 
they apply. This means that companies doing business within one of 
the listed industries that objected to being included would have a 
target within the statute to attack - the specific reference to the 
industry in question. Such an attack would likely be analyzed by the 
courts on the basis of what is called the necessarily incidental 
doctrine. The current understanding of that doctrine129 requires 
consideration of three distinct questions within the following 
analytical framework: (1) to what extent does the impugned part of 
the statute – here the inclusion in the list of industries to which the 
                                                 
128
 See, e.g., A.G. of Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association 
(Manitoba Egg Reference), [1971] S.C.R. 689. 
129
 This current understanding is based on the decision in General Motors of 
Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, supra., note 124.  
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cap-and-trade regime applies of the industry in question – encroach 
on the legislative jurisdiction of the federal order of government 
when that part is viewed in isolation? (2) is the rest of the statute 
valid? and (3) given the answer to (1), is the impugned part 
sufficiently integrated into the rest of the statute to profit from its 
validity and be considered valid itself? 
 
We are of the view that the answer to the first of these 
questions would likely be that provincial legislation that imposes 
legally enforceable constraints on the amount of carbon which 
companies within a federally regulated industry in question can emit 
in the course of conducting their normal business activities would be 
held to be a very serious encroachment on federal legislative 
jurisdiction over that industry. In fact, there is good reason to believe 
that the courts would view such provincial action as an incursion into 
the core, or “basic, minimum and unassailable content,”130 of federal 
legislative jurisdiction over the industry. That core has been defined 
in a series of cases dealing with the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity131 to include authority over labour relations and other 
important aspects of the management and operation of companies 
doing business within industries that fall within federal jurisdiction.132 
That definition seems more than broad enough to capture direct 
control of operational matters as important as production processes. 
 
It is also our view that, if the first question were to be 
answered in that manner, the courts would almost certainly hold that 
the inclusion of the federally regulated industry in the list of 
industries to which the regime is intended to apply is unconstitutional. 
While there are no cases involving the necessarily incidental doctrine 
in which the Supreme Court in answering the first question has found 
that the degree of encroachment is so great as to extend to a core area 
of federal legislative jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how the Court in 
such a case could do anything other than strike the impugned part of 
                                                 
130
 That language comes from Justice Beetz’s reasons for judgment in 
Commission de la sante et de la securite du travail v. Bell Canada, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 
749, at p. 839.  
131
 See Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law of Canada, supra., note 87, chapter 
15(8) for a general discussion of this constitutional doctrine. 
132
 Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] 
S.C.R. 767 and Commission de la sante et de la securite du travail v. Bell Canada, 
supra., note 130. 
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the statute down. If, as the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity 
requires, valid, generally worded provincial legislation cannot 
constitutionally be applied in contexts in which such application 
would result in the reach of that legislation being extended into a core 
area of federal legislation,133 it cannot be open to provincial 
legislatures to explicitly include such contexts in a list of contexts to 
which their legislation is to apply. Regardless of how closely 
integrated into the rest of the (valid) statute the impugned part might 
be, the fact that that part encroached on a core area of federal 
jurisdiction should therefore render it invalid.  
 
As noted above, the cap-and-trade regime proposed by the 
Legislature of British Columbia may be integrated into a regionally 
defined cap-and-trade system that will include at least one other 
Canadian province (Manitoba) and several of the states in the western 
United States. Would the fact that such a regime has that kind of 
regional character render it constitutionally suspect in the eyes of the 
courts? We do not believe that it would. While it is true, as noted 
above, that the regulation of international and interprovincial trade 
falls within exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction under s. 91(2) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867,134 a regime of this nature merely makes it 
possible for the undertakings governed by the British Columbia 
statute to engage in the interprovincial and international trading of 
emission allowances if they believe that it is in their interests to do so. 
It is not, as it would have to be in order to be vulnerable to attack on 
this ground, directed at the regulation of such trading.135 
 
3. Command-and-Control Regimes 
 
The ability of provincial legislatures to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions on the basis of a command-and-control approach turns 
on the same considerations as their ability to do so through the 
enactment of cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regimes. If the 
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 See Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 and British Columbia 
(Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 23 for the Supreme Court of 
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 Citizens Insurance v. Parsons, supra., note 123. 
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 See Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Quebec Agricultural Marketing Board, [1968] 
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(Manitoba Egg Reference), [1971] S.C.R. 689. 
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GASES 
 
38 
 
legislation is limited in its reach to those industries that are 
considered to fall within provincial legislative jurisdiction, it will 
therefore likely be valid. If, by contrast, the legislation is also made 
applicable to industries that are considered to fall within federal 
jurisdiction, it will be vulnerable to attack, at least insofar as its 
application to those industries is concerned. 
 
B. Federal Jurisdiction 
 
We explore here the question of whether or not it is open to 
Parliament to regulate greenhouse gas emissions through the 
mechanisms of (a) a carbon tax; (b) a cap-and-trade/intensity-based 
trading regime; (c) a command-and-control regime; and (d) the CEA 
Act. 
 
1. A Carbon Tax 
 
Unlike the provincial legislatures, the Parliament of Canada 
has a very broad power to levy taxes. Section 91(3) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 authorizes it to legislate in relation to “The 
raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.” There is 
neither any limit on the kinds of taxes Parliament can create under 
this grant of authority, nor any territorial limit. The only requirements 
are (a) that the legislation entail “taxation” and (b) that the legislation 
“rais[e] … money.”  
 
We are confident that federal legislation creating a carbon tax 
of the kind we describe above would be upheld as valid under s. 
91(3). Such legislation would both entail “taxation” and “rais[e] 
money.” While it would be open to opponents of the tax to challenge 
the validity of such a tax if it were made revenue neutral – as the tax 
proposed by the Liberals would be - on the ground that it did not 
“raise money,” we do not think that such a challenge would succeed, 
and for the same reasons we do not believe that a provincially created 
revenue neutral carbon tax would be vulnerable to attack on such a 
ground. 
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2. A  Cap-and-Trade/Intensity-Based Trading Regime 
 
In our analysis of the constitutionality of provincially created 
cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regimes, we argued that, 
provided such regimes are limited in their scope to industries whose 
business activities fall within provincial legislative jurisdiction, such 
as oil and gas, mining, manufacturing and construction, they should 
pass constitutional muster. It therefore follows that it is our view that 
a federal cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regime that is limited 
in scope to industries whose business activities fall within federal 
legislative jurisdiction, such as aeronautics, nuclear power generation 
and international/interprovincial truck and bus lines, would also pass 
constitutional muster. The more interesting and difficult question is 
whether a federal cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regime that, 
like the plan announced by the Conservative government in 2007, 
reached beyond those industries, and brought into its regulatory fold 
provincially-regulated industries such as oil and gas, construction and 
manufacturing, would survive an attack on federalism grounds. It is 
to that question that the following analysis is devoted. 
 
In our view, the federal government could reasonably seek to 
justify such legislation on the basis of one or more of the following 
bases: the criminal law power (s. 91(27)), the national concern branch 
of POGG and the national emergency branch of POGG. We do not 
believe that the federal government would be able to make a plausible 
argument on the basis of its power to regulate trade and commerce.136 
It would not be plausible to claim that such a cap-and-trade/intensity-
based trading regime is “aimed at” the regulation of international 
and/or interprovincial trading activities – that is, the movement of 
goods or services across national and/or provincial boundaries - so as 
to bring it within the first branch of that head of power.137 Nor, unless 
the regime were expanded to cover virtually every industry in the 
country, would it be plausible to claim that it was “aimed at” the 
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 For the contrary view, see Castrilli, J.F., “Legal Authority for Emissions 
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 See Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law of Canada, supra., note 87, chapter 
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general regulation of trade throughout the Dominion so as to bring it 
within the second branch.138 
 
We will now consider in turn each of the three possible bases 
we have identified. 
 
i. Criminal Law 
 
On the face of it, the highly regulatory character of a cap-and-
trade/intensity-based trading regime dealing with greenhouse gas 
emission allowances would appear to preclude such a regime being 
upheld as “criminal law.” It is true that such a regime would have 
offence-creating provisions to ensure that the companies to which the 
regime applied took seriously the obligations imposed upon them. 
But the Privy Council made it clear early on in our history that the 
mere fact that federal legislation contains offence-creating provisions 
is not enough to qualify it as “criminal law.”139 “Criminal law,” the 
Privy Council told us, is about prohibiting socially harmful conduct, 
not regulating it. That understanding of the role of criminal law, and 
hence of the reach of s. 91(27), came to be reflected in the test that 
the Supreme Court of Canada eventually established for federal 
legislation seeking support from that head of power. That test, which 
remains intact today, imposes three requirements: the legislation must 
(a) be prohibitory; (b) provide a penalty for those who violate the 
prohibition; and (c) have been enacted for “a public purpose which 
can support it as being in relation to criminal law,” with examples of 
such purposes being “public peace, order, security, health, 
morality.”140  
 
The reason for including s. 91(27) in this list of plausible 
sources of federal jurisdiction is the recent decision of the Supreme 
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 The test for the second branch can be found in General Motors of Canada 
Ltd. v. City National Leasing, supra., note 124. The Court held in that case that the 
federal Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 satisfied that test and 
upheld the Act on that ground.  That test was recently affirmed by the Court in 
Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., supra., note 125. In that case, the Court upheld 
the federal Trademarks Act, on that ground. 
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 See Reference re Board of Commerce Act, 1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 and 
Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396. 
140
 Reference re Validity of s. 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Margarine 
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Court of Canada in R. v. Hydro-Quebec.141 As noted above, the Court 
in that case, by a narrow 5-4 margin, upheld the toxic substances 
provisions of C.E.P.A. on the basis of s. 91(27) in spite of the highly 
regulatory character of those provisions. Why it was prepared to do 
that is not entirely clear from the judgment itself, but a number of 
reasons suggest themselves. One is the fact, noted by Justice LaForest 
in his majority reasons, that environmental protection does not lend 
itself to the creation of broadly defined prohibitions. As he put it, 
“Having regard to the particular nature and requirements of effective 
environmental protection legislation, I do not share my colleagues’ 
concern that the prohibition [against releasing a toxic substance in 
contravention of a permit or interim ministerial order] originates in a 
regulation….”142 Another is the importance the majority attached to 
protecting the environment. “[S]tewardship of the environment” was 
said to be “a major challenge of our time,” “an international problem, 
one that requires action by governments at all levels,” and “a 
fundamental value of our society.”143 And a third is the fact that, by 
upholding the impugned provisions under s. 91(27) instead of the 
national concern branch of POGG, the Court would avoid assigning 
exclusive jurisdiction over the release of toxic substances into the 
environment to the federal order of government.144 As Justice 
LaForest put it, “…the Constitution should be so interpreted as to 
afford both levels of government ample means to protect the 
environment while maintaining the general structure of the 
Constitution. This is hardly consistent with an enthusiastic adoption 
of the ‘national dimensions’ doctrine.”145 
 
If these were the reasons the majority upheld C.E.P.A.’s toxic 
substances provisions under s. 91(27) in Hydro-Quebec, they could 
all be invoked in support of upholding a federal cap-and-
trade/intensity-based trading regime under that head of power as well. 
But would they be viewed as strong enough reasons to do so? That is 
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 Supra., note 94. It should be noted that the 2005 Liberal Plan explicitly 
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far from clear. There are differences between a cap-and-
trade/intensity-based trading regime regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions and the regulation of toxic substances that might deter the 
courts from upholding the former under s. 91(27). One is that, unlike 
the release of toxic substances into the environment, the emission of 
carbon into the atmosphere cannot be said to cause the kind of direct 
and immediate harm that we generally associate with the use of the 
criminal law. Another is that a cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime permits companies to buy and sell the right to cause the very 
environmental harm at which it is aimed, and judges might have 
difficulty characterizing legislation with that feature – one that 
C.E.P.A.’s toxic substances provisions lack - as criminal law. 
Moreover, it would be difficult as a matter of both logic and principle 
for the courts to label a federal cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime “prohibitory” – as they would have to do in order to uphold it 
on the basis of s. 91(27) - while at the same time labeling very similar 
provincial regimes “regulatory” – as they would have to do in order 
to uphold them on the basis of ss. 92(5), 92(10), 92(13 and 92A. 
Finally, there could well be a concern on the part of the courts that, if 
they were to uphold a federal cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime under s. 91(27), there would be little if any practical 
significance left in the requirement that federal legislation must be 
“prohibitory” in character in order to qualify as “criminal law,” and, 
as a consequence, very little in the way of meaningful limits on the 
scope of federal jurisdiction under that head of power.  
 
For the reasons just given, we think the courts would be 
unlikely to hold that a federal cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime satisfied the requirement of being “prohibitory” in nature, 
with the result that such a regime would be held to fall outside the 
scope of s. 91(27). However, we should add that, if we were to prove 
wrong about that, it is our view that the courts would have little 
difficulty holding that such a regime satisfied the other two 
requirements for “criminal law,” and that it could therefore be 
sustained on the basis of that head of power. Companies subject to the 
regime would obviously face penalties for violating the terms of their 
permits, and the Supreme Court has made it clear that protecting the 
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environment qualifies as “a public purpose … sufficient to support a 
criminal prohibition.”146 
 
ii. National Concern Branch of POGG 
 
The current understanding of Parliament’s power to legislate 
for the “Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada” – commonly 
referred to as POGG – is that it has three distinct branches: (1) the 
national emergency branch; (2) the national concern branch; and (3) 
the gap branch.147 The nature and content of the first two of these 
branches will be explained in this and the following sections of this 
paper. The gap branch of POGG captures “matters” over which the 
Parliament of Canada has authority to legislate because they cannot 
plausibly be assigned to any of the enumerated classes of subject in 
sections 91 – 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  There are, in fact, 
very few such “matters” – the incorporation of companies with other 
than provincial objects148 and the creation of an official languages 
regime within the federal order of government149 are examples. 
 
The origins of the national concern branch lie in two passages 
in the reasons for judgment of Lord Watson in the Local Prohibition 
Reference.150 Those passages read as follows: 
 
“… the exercise of legislative power by the 
Parliament of Canada, in regard to all matters not 
enumerated in s. 91, ought to be strictly confined to such 
matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and 
importance, and ought not to trench upon provincial 
legislation with respect to any of the classes of subjects 
enumerated in s. 92. To attach any other construction to the 
general power which, in supplement of its enumerated 
powers, is conferred upon the Parliament of Canada by s. 91, 
would, in their Lordships’ opinion, not only be contrary to 
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147
 This understanding is reflected in Professor Hogg’s discussion of POGG in 
chapter 17 of his textbook, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra., note 104. 
148
 Citizens Insurance Co, v. Parsons, (1881), 7 A.C. 96 and John Deere Plow 
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the intendment of the Act, but would practically destroy the 
autonomy of the provinces.”151 
 
… 
 
“Their Lordships do not doubt that some matters, in 
their origin local and provincial, might attain such 
dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion, 
and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for 
their regulation or abolition in the interest of the Dominion. 
But great caution must be observed in distinguishing 
between that which is local or provincial, and therefore 
within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures, and that 
which has ceased to be merely local or provincial, and has 
become matter of national concern, in such sense as to bring 
it within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.”152 
 
These passages make it clear that, unlike the gap branch of 
POGG, the national concern branch provides Parliament with the 
authority to legislate in relation to “matters” that do have a 
connection with one or more of the classes of subjects assigned to the 
provincial legislatures. They also make it clear that, in the view of the 
Privy Council, the courts should be loath to uphold legislation under 
POGG in the face of such a connection. Only in relation to “such 
matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and importance” 
should they be willing to do so; otherwise, the interest in protecting 
provincial autonomy should hold sway.  
 
The current understanding of the national concern doctrine 
reflects a similar reluctance to permit Parliament to make frequent 
use of this branch of POGG. That understanding stipulates that, in 
order for “a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern … it 
must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly 
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of 
impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the 
fundamental distribution of legislative power under the 
Constitution.”153  It also suggests that a relevant consideration in 
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making such an assessment is “the effect on extra-provincial interests 
of a provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or 
regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of the matter.”154 The 
implication of that suggestion is that it will only be when the courts 
are satisfied that such a “provincial failure” would have significant 
harmful effects on extra-provincial interests that they should be 
willing to hold that a matter qualifies as a matter of truly national 
concern. 
 
Another important feature of the current understanding of the 
national concern doctrine has already been noted. It is that the 
consequence of the courts holding that a particular matter is a matter 
of national concern is not simply that Parliament has the authority to 
legislate in relation to it, but also that Parliament’s authority to do so 
is exclusive. That matter, “including its provincial aspects,”155 is 
removed in its entirety from provincial legislative jurisdiction. This 
feature of the doctrine can only add to the courts’ reluctance to use 
the national concern branch as a basis for upholding federal 
legislation, particularly in relation to social and economic issues in 
which the provinces can be said to have a strong and legitimate 
interest.156 
 
Would the federal government succeed in having a cap-and-
trade/intensity-based trading regime of the kind we are considering – 
one that applied to all of the industries responsible for emitting large 
amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, not just those that, like 
aeronautics and international/interprovincial truck and bus lines, are 
understood to fall within federal legislative jurisdiction - upheld 
under POGG on the basis that it dealt with a matter of national 
concern? The answer to that question would depend at least in part on 
the manner in which the “matter” of such a regime was formulated. 
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Some formulations might serve, at least superficially, to distinguish 
the subject matter of the regime from matters of provincial concern 
more effectively than others, and counsel for the federal government 
would obviously try to develop a formulation that achieved that goal. 
But there are clearly limits to how creative one can be in the drafting 
exercise. The proffered “matter” cannot be drafted too broadly, 
because the more broadly it is cast, the greater the threat to provincial 
autonomy it would be seen to pose, and the less likely the courts 
would be to hold that it satisfied the test.157 It must also accurately 
reflect the content of the legislation. Bearing these considerations in 
mind, we presume that it would be formulated in terms of something 
like “protecting against the harmful effects of global warming by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions on the part of Canadian industry.”  
 
In our view, it is unlikely that the courts would find that such 
a matter qualified as a matter of national concern.158 The fact that the 
federal legislation would have been enacted in furtherance of 
Canada’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, and deals with a 
matter of “predominantly extra-provincial character and 
implications,” would likely count in favour of such a finding. So too 
would the fact that the failure of provincial governments to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions effectively could be said to result in 
harmful extra-provincial effects. How much weight the latter factor 
would be assigned, however, is an open question. The challenger 
would certainly be in a position to argue that it should be given 
minimal weight. That argument would be grounded in the fact that, 
by any fair measure, those extra-provincial effects would be very 
indirect and of little overall significance, given that Canada as a 
whole is responsible for approximately two percent of the total 
greenhouse gas emissions in the world and, moreover, that 
greenhouse gas emissions are one of a number of human and other 
causes of global warming. On the other side of the ledger is the fact 
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that the “matter” of the kind of regime we are contemplating could 
very plausibly be said to lack the required “singleness, distinctiveness 
and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of 
provincial concern.” It would be very easy for the courts to find that 
that “matter” is not a single or indivisible “matter” at all – it is simply 
a combination of a federal “matter” - “the regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions by federally regulated undertakings” and a provincial 
“matter” - “the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by 
provincially regulated undertakings.” Also on the negative side of the 
ledger would be “the scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction” of 
allowing Parliament to enact a comprehensive cap-and-trade regime 
for the entire country. That impact would almost certainly be seen by 
the courts to be extremely high, particularly for provinces like 
Alberta. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the fact that 
provincial legislatures would be precluded from regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions by industries such as oil and gas, 
manufacturing and construction if the courts were to uphold a 
comprehensive federal cap-and-trade regime on the basis of the 
national concern doctrine. That, we believe, is not a consequence 
upon which our courts would look at all favourably. 
 
iii. National Emergency Branch of POGG 
 
The national emergency branch of POGG has its origins in the 
judgments of Lord Haldane in the early part of the 20th century. He 
was a strong believer in the need to restrict the scope of federal 
legislative jurisdiction in order to protect provincial autonomy, and 
that belief led him to construe the POGG power even more narrowly 
than had Lord Watson in the Local Prohibition Reference. It was his 
position that Parliament could only make use of POGG in 
“exceptional” circumstances, such as “war or famine,” when the 
nation as a whole was truly “imperilled”159 and legislative 
intervention by the federal order of government was required to save 
it from disaster. That position was rejected in subsequent cases,160 but 
the notion that Parliament should be able to legislate in times of 
national emergency has remained part of the law, and has given rise 
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to the existence of what we now refer to as the national emergency 
branch of POGG.  
 
The jurisprudence relating to this branch of POGG, in 
particular the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference 
re Anti-Inflation Act,161 has generated a body of doctrine upon which 
the courts would be expected to rely if the federal government sought 
to invoke it in support of a comprehensive cap-and-trade/intensity-
based trading regime. That body of doctrine can in our view be 
summarized as follows: (1) the federal government can rely on the 
emergency branch both to respond to existing emergencies and to 
prevent new emergencies from arising;162 (2) emergencies for this 
purpose are not limited to those identified by Lord Haldane in his 
judgments, but can include economic emergencies, such as a high rate 
of inflation;163 (3) the courts should be loath to second-guess a 
decision by the federal government that an emergency exists or is 
threatened, and need only be satisfied that the government had a 
“rational basis” for making such a decision;164 (4) the emergency 
branch can only be invoked to sustain legislation of temporary 
duration;165 (5) the legislation should indicate, in a preamble or 
otherwise, that it has been enacted for the purpose of dealing at least 
with “a serious national condition”166 if not a national emergency; 
and (6) unlike in the case of the national concern branch, upholding 
federal legislation on the basis of the national emergency branch does 
not preclude the provincial legislatures from legislating in their own 
ways to deal with the emergency in question (assuming they can do 
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so in a manner that respects the limits on provincial legislative 
authority under s. 92).167 
 
In our view, there is good reason to believe that courts 
applying this body of doctrine could well uphold a comprehensive 
federal cap-and-trade regime under the emergency branch of POGG. 
The fact that the doctrine permits Parliament to act in anticipation of 
a new emergency arising would serve federal interests in a very direct 
way, and there seems little reason to doubt that an environmental 
disaster of the kind that global climate change portends would be held 
to qualify as an emergency for this purpose. The posture of judicial 
restraint that the doctrine calls for in evaluating the need for 
legislative action would also serve federal interests well. The 
requirement of temporary duration is one that can be met by careful 
drafting, as can the need for appropriate signaling. Finally, the fact 
that upholding such a regime on the basis of this branch would leave 
it open to the provincial legislatures to take whatever steps they 
consider advisable to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would make it 
a much more attractive option to the courts than the national concern 
branch. 
 
It will have been noted that the previous paragraph referred 
only to a cap-and-trade regime, rather than, as in all of our preceding 
analyses, to both a cap-and-trade regime and an intensity-based 
trading regime. The omission of a reference to the latter was 
deliberate. Even with a posture of judicial restraint, we think it 
unlikely that the courts would consider a regime that, like an 
intensity-based trading regime, permitted greenhouse gas emissions 
to increase over time to constitute a genuine attempt by Parliament to 
respond to a pending national disaster. It is only the cap-and-trade 
option that in our view could plausibly be defended on the basis of 
the national emergency branch of POGG. 
 
Any suggestion that the federal government was considering 
the use of the emergency branch would undoubtedly result in strong 
opposition from the provincial governments, who would portray such 
an initiative as a direct and profound assault on their ability to devise 
and implement policies that they consider to be appropriate to their 
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respective economies and populations. However, the federal 
government could minimize the sting of that opposition by making it 
clear that the federal government would only pursue such an initiative 
if the provincial legislatures did not take what it considered to be 
strong enough action over the course of a prescribed time period. It 
could also draft its legislation in such a way as to make its 
implementation contingent on that condition being met.   
 
3.  A Command-and-Control Regime 
 
The ability of Parliament under s. 91 to enact a command-and-
control regime designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would in 
our view turn on the same considerations as its ability to enact a cap-
and-trade regime. If a federal command-and-control regime were 
limited in its scope to industries whose business activities fall within 
federal legislative jurisdiction, it would almost certainly be valid. 
Only if its reach extended into what we consider to be the provincial 
sphere – oil and gas, manufacturing, construction and so on – would 
its validity be open to attack.  
 
Such an extended command-and-control regime could 
plausibly be defended on the basis of the same sources of federal 
legislative jurisdiction as an extended cap-and-trade/intensity-based 
trading regime – s. 91(27), the national concern branch of POGG and 
the national emergency branch of POGG. In our view, the analysis we 
provided above of the viability of the latter two sources of jurisdiction 
in the context of a federal cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime would apply equally well in the context of a command-and-
control regime. Hence, we believe that such a regime would likely not 
be upheld under the national concern branch of POGG, but that it 
could well be upheld under the national emergency branch. Insofar as 
s. 91(27) is concerned, our view remains that the courts would be 
unlikely to sustain such a regime on that basis. However, part of the 
analysis we provided above of the viability of this source of 
jurisdiction in the context of a cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading 
regime would have no relevance in this other context. Unlike a cap-
and-trade/intensity-based trading regime, a command-and-control 
regime does not permit the companies governed by it to sell the right 
to cause the very environmental harm at which the regime is aimed. 
That difference would in our view reduce somewhat the strength of 
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the arguments against permitting Parliament to rely on the criminal 
law power. It would not, however, reduce their strength enough to 
persuade the courts to uphold such a regime as criminal law. 
 
4. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
 
The final regulatory option to be considered is the use of the 
C.E.A.A. to require federal authorities to consider the greenhouse gas 
implications of new projects governed by that statute before 
approving them. It will be recalled that that statute calls for 
environmental assessments in respect of projects that a federal 
authority is itself proposing, that a federal authority intends to support 
financially, that involves the sale or lease of federal lands or that 
implicates an area of federal concern identified by regulation.168 It 
will also be recalled that, in making such assessments, review panels 
are required to consider “any change that the project may cause in the 
environment,” with “environment” to be understood as encompassing 
“…air, including all layers of the atmosphere.”169 
 
In our view, there is every reason to believe that this option 
would, if challenged, be upheld as constitutionally valid. The 
Supreme Court of Canada in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. 
Canada170 made it clear that it is open to Parliament to require that 
the environmental implications of projects that engage areas of 
federal concern be considered before they are approved. The Court 
also held that, in assessing those implications, the reviewing bodies 
are entitled to take into account all of the possible environmental 
effects of such projects. In the course of his majority reasons for 
judgment in that case, Justice LaForest considered the example of a 
project involving the construction of a new interprovincial railway. In 
his view, a panel asked to assess the environmental implications of 
such a project would be entitled to take into account the impact of the 
new line on “ecologically sensitive habitats such as wetlands and 
forests,” potential hazards to “the health and safety of nearby 
communities if dangerous commodities are to be carried on the line,” 
and the possible “economic benefit to those communities through job 
creation and the multiplier effect that will have on the local 
                                                 
168
 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, s. 5(1). 
169
 Ibid., ss. 2(1) and 16(1). 
170
 Supra., note 79. 
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economy.”171 In fact, he said, not to permit the panel to consider such 
matters “would lead to the most astonishing results, and it defies 
reason to assert that Parliament is constitutionally barred from 
weighing the broad environmental repercussions, including socio-
economic concerns, when legislating with respect to decisions of this 
nature.”172  
 
Was it important to Justice LaForest’s reasoning in this regard 
that interprovincial railways are federal undertakings under s. 
92(10(a) and therefore, qua undertakings, within exclusive federal 
jurisdiction? Would he have taken a more restrained view of the 
permissible scope of a federally-mandated environmental assessment 
if the project in question had been one that fell prima facie within 
provincial jurisdiction – like the dam in Oldman River itself – with 
the federal interest being limited to the impact of that project on an 
area of federal jurisdiction – like the navigability of the Oldman 
River? We believe not.173 Justice LaForest did not draw any such 
distinction himself, as he could well have done given the nature of the 
case he had before him. Moreover, he referred with approval to an 
Australian case, Murphyores Incorporated Pty. Ltd. v. 
Commonwealth of Australia, in which the High Court had upheld the 
constitutionality of an inquiry under Commonwealth legislation into 
the environmental impact of the mining of particular substances by a 
company seeking permission to export those substances, even though 
the mining activity was acknowledged to be “predominantly a state 
interest.” The decision in that case was used to exemplify the 
proposition that, even in a federal state,  
 
“…[i]n legislating regarding a subject, it is sufficient 
that the legislative body legislate on that subject. The 
practical purpose that inspires the legislation and the 
implications that body must consider in making its decision 
are another thing. Absent a colourable purpose or a lack of 
                                                 
171
 Ibid., at p. 66. 
172
 Ibid. 
173
 For the contrary view, see S.A. Kennett, “Federal Environmental 
Jurisdiction after Oldman,” (1993), 38 McGill L.J. 180. We note, however, that 
Meinhard Doelle reaches the same conclusion we do on this issue in his recent 
book, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique 
(LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2008), at 67 – 71.  
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bona fides, these considerations will not detract from the 
fundamental nature of the legislation.” 
 
 We conclude, therefore, that it is open to the agencies of the 
federal government to include greenhouse gas emissions in the list of 
environmental concerns to be considered by panels constituted under 
the C.E.A.A.. 
 
C. Federal Paramountcy 
 
We consider here the question of whether or not provincial 
legislation designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would be 
held to be inoperative under the federal paramountcy doctrine in the 
face of federal legislation enacted for the same purpose. That doctrine 
applies whenever valid provincial legislation is found to “conflict” 
with valid federal legislation. The current understanding of the term 
“conflict” on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada can be 
summarized as follows: provincial legislation will only be held to be 
in conflict with federal legislation if (a) it is impossible for those to 
whom the two enactments purportedly apply to comply with both; (b) 
it is impossible for the courts or other state decision-makers to give 
simultaneous effect to both enactments; and (c) application of the 
provincial enactment would frustrate the purpose of the federal.174  
 
Whether or not a particular provincial statute will be held to 
conflict with a particular federal statute depends on the precise terms 
of both. Confident predictions about the fate of particular provincial 
statutes are therefore generally very difficult if not impossible to 
make before all of those terms are known. However, we can say with 
a fair degree of confidence that, given the Supreme Court’s current 
understanding of “conflict,” we think it unlikely that provincial 
legislation of the kinds that we are examining in this paper would be 
rendered inoperative by federal legislation of the kinds we are 
considering. That is particularly true of provincial carbon taxes. But it 
is also true of the cap-and-trade/intensity-based trading regimes, even 
if they impose tighter controls than similar federal regimes. The 
purpose of the two regimes will be fundamentally the same, and the 
                                                 
174
 See Elliot, R.M., “Safeguarding Provincial Autonomy from the Supreme 
Court’s New Paramountcy Doctrine: A Constructive Role for the Intention to Cover 
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Supreme Court of Canada has on numerous occasions let stand 
provincial legislation that went further than federal in regulating 
harmful conduct in such circumstances.175 Moreover, in Hydro-
Quebec, the Court expressed a strong preference for permitting both 
orders of government to legislate to protect the environment. The 
majority’s choice of s. 91(27) as the head of power upon which to 
uphold the toxic substances provisions of the C.E.P.A. was based in 
part on their desire to leave room for the provincial legislatures to 
“exercis[e] their extensive powers under s. 92 to regulate and control 
the pollution of the environment either independently or to 
supplement federal action.”176 It would clearly be inconsistent with 
that preference for the courts to use the paramountcy doctrine 
liberally and hold provincial environmental protection legislation 
inoperative if provincial legislatures accept the invitation the Court 
has given them. 
 
D. Summary 
 
In summary, then, it is our view that both orders of 
government have a relatively broad array of options available to them 
under the Constitution to deal with greenhouse gas emissions. The 
provincial legislatures can levy a carbon tax on consumers. They can 
also impose a range of different kinds of regulatory regimes on the 
main industrial emitters of greenhouse gases within their respective 
boundaries, provided only that the regimes are limited in their 
application to industries that are understood to fall within provincial 
legislative jurisdiction. Parliament, too, can levy a carbon tax. And it, 
too, can impose a range of different kinds of regulatory regimes on 
industrial emitters. Its authority to create such regimes is clearest if 
the regimes are limited in scope to those industries that are 
understood to fall within federal legislative jurisdiction.  It is 
possible, given the extent and nature of the problem, that, using the 
national emergency branch of POGG, Parliament could impose such 
a regime on all industrial emitters. And, finally, it is open to the 
federal government to use the provisions of the C.E.A.A. to assist in 
its efforts to control climate change.   
 
                                                 
175
 See the discussion of these cases in Hogg, P., supra., note 87 chapter 
16(4)(a). 
176
 Supra., note 94, at para.131. 
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What that means is that the choices that our governments 
make in this area will – or at least should - be based primarily on 
considerations of policy. And it is to precisely those considerations 
that we now turn. 
 
IV. The Policy Dimension 
 
Apart from the constitutional considerations, there are sharp 
policy differences that render some options considerably better than 
others.  The effectiveness in reducing greenhouse gas emissions is 
very much tied into the ease with which the regulatory options can be 
incorporated into Canada's regulatory infrastructure, and it is here 
where the options diverge.  A discussion of the main regulatory 
options outlined in Section II.A. follows.  
 
A. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
 
If a federal government were to score political points by 
undertaking some climate change action, there is no lower-hanging 
fruit than the use of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.  
The use of the environmental assessment process, a common one 
throughout the world,177 is one that other countries have used to 
challenge greenhouse gas-emitting projects or policies.  In the U.S., a 
number of cases178 have involved administrative decisions with 
greenhouse gas implications.  For example, in Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 
the city of Los Angeles challenged a decision by the U.S. National 
Highway and Transportation Safety Agency to loosen vehicle fuel 
efficiency standards by as little as one mile per gallon, arguing that 
this would lead to greater gasoline consumption, more greenhouse 
gas emissions, and the attendant increased danger of global climate 
                                                 
 
177
  The environmental assessment process first implemented by the U.S. 
National Environmental Policy Act in 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq. (1970), has 
been copied by at least twenty-five U.S. states and eighty countries. Council on 
Environmental Quality, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of Its 
Effectiveness After Twenty-Five Years 3 (1997); available online at 
http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf.  
 
178
 Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), overruled in part 
by Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Friends of 
the Earth v. Robert Mosbacher, Jr., No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Border Power 
Plant Working Group v. Dept. of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003); 
NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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change.  In each of the cases, the administrative agency did not 
prepare an "Environmental Impact Statement" under the National 
Environmental Policy Act,179 which is required unless the agency 
makes a preliminary "Environmental Assessment" that the project 
will have no significant impact.180  All of these cases challenged the 
agency findings that there would be no significant impact.  While the 
results have been mixed, no court has questioned the appropriateness 
of a fairly detailed evaluation of the greenhouse gas impacts of the 
projects or administrative actions.   
 
In Australia, a similar cluster of cases involving the 
development of coal mines has arisen, in which plaintiffs sought to 
use the environmental assessment process to force consideration of 
greenhouse gas emissions.181  The suits were against administrative 
review panels that had considered applications to develop coal mines 
to keep coal-fired power plants in operation, and all of which failed to 
consider the greenhouse gas emission impact of the proposed mines.  
Plaintiffs were successful in forcing an administrative consideration 
of greenhouse gas emissions in two of the three.  In New Zealand, as 
well, a number of cases have arisen involving the failure to consider 
net greenhouse gas effects in refusing applications for wind farms.182  
Also, in Greenpeace New Zealand Incorporated v. Northland 
Regional Council and Mighty River Power Limited,183 the High Court 
of New Zealand held that an administrative agency was empowered 
to consider greenhouse gas emissions in considering whether to grant 
an application for a coal-fired power plant.  
 
                                                 
 
179
 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370f. 
 
180
 This is the standard under the National Environmental Policy Act, 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.13. 
 
181
 Australian Conservation Foundation v. Latrobe City Council, 140 LGERA 
100 (2004); Gray v. The Minister for Planning, (2006) NSWLEC 720; Wildlife 
Preservation Society of Queensland v. Minister of Environment and Heritage 
(2006) FCA 736, 2006 WL 1644868. 
 
182
 Genesis Power Limited v. Franklin District Council, (2005) NZRMA 541; 
Meridian Energy Ltd. and Others v. Wellington City Council, (2007) No. W31/07 
(Environment Ct.); Environmental Defense Society v. Auckland Regional Council 
and Contact Energy Limited, (2002) 11 NZRMA 492; Environmental Defense 
Society and Taranaki Energy Watch v. Taranaki Regional Council and Stratford 
Power Limited, (2002) No. A184/02 (Environment Ct.). 
 
183
 (2006) NZHC 1212. 
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The idea of using environmental assessment to consider 
greenhouse gas effects is not new to Canada, but the practice has been 
spotty.  A 2000 report published by the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency ("CEA Agency") concluded that "[t]he extent to 
which climate change was factored into each environmental 
assessment varies considerably," and that "a gap exists between 
climate change science and its application to the EA community."184 
 
As part two of this environmental assessment project, the 
CEA Agency published a guidance document for project reviewers, 
entitled Climate Change and Environmental Assessment, Part 2: 
Climate Change Guidance for Environmental Assessments,185 but it is 
a bit unclear how this could assist project reviewers.  The report is a 
competent review of the literature for the time in which it was written 
– 2000 – but it seems to propose that environmental assessments 
utilize climate models used to assess global climate conditions.  
These models have been used by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change186 to make global projections of climate, and are the 
best tools available to assess large, global impacts, but they are 
unhelpful in assessing the impacts of a single project. Even huge 
greenhouse gas-emitting projects, when assessed with the tools that 
climatologists have been using to make rough global predictions, will 
appear to have a negligible effect on global conditions.  The tools 
described in this document are far too large to answer smaller 
questions. 
 
The CEA Agency has also published, with provincial and 
territorial agencies, a general guidance document for incorporating 
climate change into all environmental assessments, not just the CEA 
                                                 
 
184
  Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Climate Change and 
Environmental Assessment, Part 1: Review of Climate Change Considerations in 
Selected Past Environmental Assessments (2000), abstract online http://www.acee-
ceaa.gc.ca/015/001/005/abstract_e.htm.  
 
185
 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Climate Change and 
Environmental Assessment, Part 2: Climate Change Guidance for Environmental 
Assessments (2000) available online at 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/015/001/004/index_e.htm.  
 
186
 The IPCC is a UN body of scientists charged with making a number of 
scientific findings and recommendations to world policymakers with respect to 
global climate change.  http://www.ipcc.ch/  
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Act.187  Perhaps its genesis as a cross-jurisdictional and cooperative 
effort necessitates its being modest and general; the document states 
that it is intended as "general guidance, to be considered at the 
discretion of jurisdictions and regulatory authorities,"188 and that 
"[t]he consideration of climate change in environmental assessments 
is not intended to impose any mitigation obligations over and above 
the obligations that will be imposed through the implementation of 
the general climate change policies."189  Guidance documents 
published by the CEA Agency have received very little deference 
from agencies or courts anyway.190   
 
As a formal matter, then, there is little in the way of 
procedural or substantive requirements that the environmental 
assessment process include consideration of the greenhouse gas 
effects of a project.  This does not mean that greenhouse gas 
considerations are never taken into account under the CEA Act.  In a 
Joint Panel Review involving the National Energy Board ("NEB") for 
construction of a gas pipeline in British Columbia, the Panel 
undertook a very brief discussion of the greenhouse gas effects of the 
pipeline – two pages out of 229 for the entire report.191  Construction 
of the gas pipeline would emit 11,526 tonnes of CO2-eq, less than 
0.02% of British Columbia's total, and a tiny fraction of Canada's 
emissions.  The Panel noted that the emissions were "minor in 
comparison to overall emissions on Vancouver Island," and that [on] 
a global scale, any change in climate or the environment caused by 
GHG emissions from the Project could not be defined, measured or 
described.192  The Panel also complained that "at the present time, 
there are no defined criteria to measure significance in relation to 
                                                 
 
187
 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, "Incorporating Climate 
Change Considerations in Environmental Assessment: General Guidance for 
Practitioners (2003), online at http://www.acee.gc.ca/012/014/climatechange_e.pdf.    
 
188
  Ibid. at 1. 
 
189
  Ibid. at 2-3. 
 
190
  See, e.g, Friends of the West Country Assn. v. Canada (Minister of 
Fisheries & Oceans), 31 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 239, 248 N.R. 25, 169 F.T.R. 298 (note), 
[2000] 2 F.C. 263, para. 22 ("I do not find the independent utility principle or the 
portions of the Guide which may reflect the independent utility principle helpful for 
the purpose of interpreting subsection 15(3) of the CEAA…," Rothstein, J.) 
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 Joint Review Panel Report, GSX Canada Pipeline Project (2003), available 
online at http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/010/0001/0001/0004/0002/report_e.pdf.  
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GHG when considered in an environmental assessment. . . . Had there 
been detailed policies or regulations for targets in place, the Panel 
could have evaluated GHG emissions against these."193  So how is a 
panel to meet its mandate under sections 20 and 37 of the CEA Act, 
to determine whether it is "likely that the project will result in 
significant adverse environmental effects"?194   
 
In the absence of any federal or provincial guidance on how to 
evaluate the environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions, the 
Panel laid the project against the backdrop of federal and provincial 
initiatives to reduce greenhouse gases, and assessed whether the 
pipeline would prejudice the ability of Canada to meet its Kyoto 
commitments.195  It concluded that it would not: 
 
[N]ew natural gas pipeline and energy generation 
projects have been factored into the outlook. Because 
such developments have been incorporated in the 
outlook, the GSX project should not compromise 
Canada’s ability to reach our Kyoto target.196 
 
In other words, the Panel concluded that the pipeline was 
consistent with the then-Liberal federal government plan for how 
Canada would meet its Kyoto Protocol commitment.  The Panel 
evaluated the significance of the environmental effects not by any 
empirical determination, but by evaluating whether the greenhouse 
gases were anticipated by governmental greenhouse gas reduction 
plans. 
 
Concerning another project, in Pembina Institute v. Canada 
(Attorney General),197 the court held that, in conducting a joint panel 
review under the CEA Act, the panel failed to address adequately the 
environmental effects of the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from 
the proposed Kearl Oil Sands project, one that would emit an average 
of 3.7 Mt of CO2 every year over its 5-year life, accounting for about 
0.5% of Canada's annual emissions and 1.6% of Alberta's annual 
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  Ibid at 58. 
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 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, §§ 20, 37. 
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  Ibid at 58. 
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emissions.198  The court held that the panel erred in not "explain[ing] 
in a general way why the potential environmental effects, either with 
or without the implementation of mitigation measures, will be 
insignificant,"199 and failing to provide a "clear and cogent 
articulation of the reasons behind the Panel's conclusion."200  The 
court remitted the matter back to the Panel for the sole purpose of 
stating the bases for its conclusion that the environmental impacts 
would be insignificant. 
 
The Panel responded, in an amendment: 
 
"[T]here was very little evidence before the Joint Panel 
to suggest that this release will result in significant 
adverse environmental effect. To the contrary, it was 
the evidence of [Alberta Environment] that it may 
require Imperial to reach its stated GHG intensity 
target of 40 kg of CO2e per barrel in any EPEA 
approval granted for the Project. The Joint Panel finds 
that it must give [Alberta Environment]’s endorsement 
of the target significant weight in its consideration of 
the adverse environmental effects of the Project given 
[Alberta Environment]’s role as the provincial agency 
responsible for establishing, monitoring and enforcing 
emission standards."201 
 
Like the Joint Panel Review of the British Columbia gas 
pipeline, the Kearl Oil Sands Panel looked to regulatory programs in 
place and decided that the project was in keeping with or accounted 
for by existing regulatory programs.  Lacking any guidance as to 
whether projected greenhouse gas emissions were "likely to result in 
a significant adverse environmental effect," the panel essentially 
deferred to governmental agencies that are apparently working on the 
problem.   
                                                 
 
198
 The reference year used was 2005.  See tables referenced in supra, notes 5 
and 11. 
 
199
 Ibid, at para. 73. 
 
200
 Ibid, at para. 78. 
 
201
 Joint Panel Report, Kearl Oil Sands Project, Addendum to EUB Decision 
2007-013, Additional rationale for the joint review panel’s conclusion on air 
emissions, May 6, 2008; available online at 
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One can be forgiven for struggling with the determination of 
the significance of a large, project-specific increase in greenhouse gas 
emissions in a legal void.  Making that determination by reference to 
a regulatory backdrop seems like a reasonable alternative to throwing 
up one's hands and concluding that the greenhouse gas emissions of 
any single project will have no significant effect in the global context.  
The problem is that this approach has no basis in law.  Under the 
CEA Act, the critical determination is whether a project is "likely to 
have a significant adverse environmental effect"202 ("SAEE").  Such 
an inquiry must focus on the environmental effects themselves, not on 
whether the project is in keeping with a provincial or federal agency's 
grand plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  In fact, 
environmental assessment is in part meant to act as a check on agency 
discretion, bringing to light environmental information that would 
otherwise be embarrassing or unfavourable to project development.203  
It would thus be ironic to use governmental policy as the reference 
point for determining what is a SAEE.  Moreover, greenhouse gas 
reduction plans including Canada's and Alberta's do not and could not 
purport to have any measurable effect on the concentration of global 
greenhouse gases in the future.  These initiatives only attempt, as they 
could only possibly attempt, to constitute Canada's and Alberta's part 
in reducing greenhouse gases globally. 
 
Lurking in the background is the much more difficult question 
of whether the CEA Act, as currently constituted, can address climate 
change at all.  If, as we argue, the CEA Act does not permit a 
determination of environmental impact on the basis of a project's 
consistency with legislation or with some governmental plan or 
policy, then can the CEA Act do anything to address climate change?  
The obvious problem is one that pervades every effort to address 
climate change: viewed incrementally on an individual project-by-
project basis, even large projects are tiny in the context of global 
greenhouse emissions.  While the Kearl Oil Sands project is 
unusually large in terms of greenhouse gas emissions (an expected 
3.7 Mt of CO2-eq, or 0.5% of Canada's emissions), it would still have 
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  Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, ss. 20, 37. 
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  Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, Monitoring and Managing 
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904-05 
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been a mere 0.05% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions in 
2004.204   
 
This is true even if the reviewers diligently consider "any 
cumulative environmental effects that are likely to result from the 
project in combination with other projects or activities that have been 
or will be carried out."205  Considering the cumulative impact of a 
large project such as the Kearl Oil Sands project would sensitize the 
reviewer to the fact that this contribution to greenhouse gases comes 
on top of a century of an anthropogenic buildup of greenhouse gases, 
and that each incremental increase makes it that much more likely 
that some catastrophic outcome will result.  But with emissions from 
China and India growing by leaps and bounds,206 it is hard to resist 
the expedient conclusion that no project, not even the gargantuan 
Kearl Oil Sands project, would make any significant difference in 
terms of greenhouse gases.  It would be difficult to see, under a 
common sense reading of section 37 of the CEA Act, how one of 
many incremental additions – even a large one – of carbon dioxide 
from the Kearl Oil Sands project would be "likely" to cause SAEE 
within the meaning of the section. 
 
The responsible answer to the more difficult question is, of 
course, that work must commence immediately on curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions, even if that work is, by itself, ineffectual 
in making a difference on climate change.  The CEA Act, having 
been in place for over a decade, and having acquired a body of 
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 Gregg Marland, Bob Andres, & Tom Boden, Global CO2 Emissions from 
Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751-2004, Carbon 
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratories, (2007), 
available online at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/ndp030/global.1751_2004.ems.  
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  Canadian Environmental Assessment Act s. 16(1)(a). 
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 China emitted 1366 Mt of CO2-eq in 2004, more than double its 1990 
emissions of 655 Mt in 1990 (Gregg Marland, Bob Andres, & Tom Boden, Global 
CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 
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Laboratories, (2007), available online at 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/emissions/prc.dat); India emitted 366 Mt in 2004 
almost double its 1990 emissions of 186 Mt in 1990 (Gregg Marland, Bob Andres, 
& Tom Boden, Global CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement 
Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751-2004, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis 
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jurisprudence (albeit maddeningly inconsistent207), is an obvious 
mechanism for inserting a level of review that ensures that federal 
projects take greenhouse gas considerations into account.  The CEA 
Act has certainly been invoked in the past to halt projects with 
extremely compelling economic justifications, such as the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline.208  There is no reason to think that this same 
mechanism cannot now be invoked for the cause of climate change.  
 
But the terms of the CEA Act need amendment to specifically 
incorporate climate change concerns.  Because the current CEA Act 
standard of SAEE is not useful in the climate change context, another 
must be developed.  Either a legislative change must be made to adapt 
this phraseology to climate change, or by regulation, the phrase must 
be defined in terms of what is permitted in the way of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Guidance documents, because of their legal ineffectuality, 
are unlikely to be of help. 
 
A legislative solution would appear to be the cleanest 
approach to adapting the CEA Act to climate change concerns.  The 
SAEE concept is ill-fitted to the complicated and global problem of 
greenhouse gases, and a different standard would take an existing and 
familiar procedural mechanism – the CEA Act – and incorporate a 
new type of consideration.  Companion sections paralleling sections 
20 and 37 of the CEA Act might provide for a separate decision 
process evaluating a project specifically for its greenhouse gas 
emissions.  We do not argue for any specific threshold standard for 
greenhouse gases, but note that a panel might be reasonably called 
upon to ensure that any project subject to the CEA Act be "carbon 
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neutral,"209 or "have undertaken reasonable efforts to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions," or some other standard reasonably 
susceptible of review by a panel.  The most important move would be 
to require explicitly some greenhouse gas considerations for CEA Act 
projects, and to provide some guidance for panels and agencies 
reviewing such projects. 
 
The problem with a legislative solution has more to do with 
politics.  In the five years since Canadian ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2002,210 the Canadian federal government has failed 
miserably to enact greenhouse gas legislation.  As discussed above, 
federal politicians have had far more interest in tossing climate 
change around as a political football than in any genuine resolve to 
address the climate change problem. 
 
The simpler solution would be, then, to define by regulation 
SAEE for a federal project that involves greenhouse gases.  By 
regulatory fiat, Environment Canada could decree that any federal 
project that is not, say, carbon neutral, has a SAEE, and hence must 
not be approved or must be "justified under the circumstances" in 
order to proceed.211  The usual objection to such an administrative 
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approach – that it can be easily undone – seems less weighty in light 
of the pressing need to address greenhouse gas emissions sooner 
rather than later.  Moreover, given the inability of the Canadian 
federal government to enact greenhouse gas legislation, the 
expediency advantages of this administrative solution seem that much 
more important.  The danger with such a regulatory approach is that it 
could be challenged and struck down on the grounds that it is ultra 
vires.  An argument can be made that the CEA Act was never meant 
to be a substantive policy tool. One can argue that the purpose of the 
CEA Act was merely to ensure that a serious examination of 
environmental effects is undertaken, not that effective substantive 
policy results are achieved. 
 
Although the CEA Act is a logical place to start in terms of 
engaging the federal government in greenhouse gases, it is important 
to recognize the limitations of this approach.  It can only address new 
projects, and does nothing to bring existing sources of greenhouse gas 
emissions under control.  With Canada needing a 25% reduction from 
current emissions to meet its Kyoto targets, holding firm on the status 
quo is insufficient.  Adapting the CEA Act to include project review 
of the greenhouse gas implications is an important part, but only a 
part, of a Canadian response to the climate change problem. 
 
B. Cap-and-trade vs. Intensity-based Emissions Trading 
 
First conceived of in the 1960s by economist J.H. Dales,212 the 
cap-and-trade idea is one of the major administrative reforms in the 
last three decades, taking the vast majority of pollution decisions out 
of the domain of government policy and placing them into the hands 
of emitters.  The most notable and successful cap-and-trade program 
to date has been the U.S. SO2 ("SO2") emissions trading plan,213 in 
which nearly all of the fossil fuel-fired electricity generating plants in 
the U.S. were allocated a certain number of allowances and required 
to have an allowance for each ton of SO2 emitted.  The allocation of 
permits is based on an historical baseline (a string of years in the 
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1980s), and is lower than the historical baseline so that some overall 
emissions reduction is achieved.  In its initial phase, the program 
imposed a somewhat hard nationwide "cap" of 8.95 tons of SO2 per 
year,214 while in subsequent years more facilities have been included 
and the cap slightly raised.215  The U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade program 
reduced SO2 emissions nationwide from over 21 million tons in 1994 
to under 14 million in 2006.216 
 
Partly as a result of the perceived success of the SO2 program, 
emissions trading has gained worldwide acceptance as a way to 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.  The Kyoto Protocol 
explicitly endorses emissions trading, permitting not only individual 
countries to achieve their national targets by emissions trading, but 
encouraging trading by and between countries.217  The European 
Union has committed itself, in addition to the commitment of its 
member states, to an emissions reduction of eight percent below its 
1990 levels,218 and has undertaken an EU-wide emissions trading 
program to achieve it.219   
 
While cap-and-trade programs minimize industry-wide 
compliance costs, they still impose them.  If compliance was costless, 
then the environmental benefits would be nil.  Some politicians have 
sought to soften the economic blow further, and proposed cap-and-
trade programs that peg allowances to productivity.  Emissions are 
thus measured in "intensity" terms, essentially dividing the absolute 
amount of emissions by some denominator that has to do with the 
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quantity or value of product produced.  Greenhouse gas emissions 
intensity from electricity generation, for example, would be measured 
in terms of tonnes of CO2 per kilowatt-hour produced, so that if more 
efficient combustion techniques were discovered, boosting the 
amount of electricity produced, the amount of allowed CO2 emissions 
would be increased.   
 
The problem with intensity-based programs is that there is no 
credible way of knowing what actual greenhouse gas emissions will 
ultimately be, or even certainty that there will be any reduction at all.  
If, for a particular emitter, production efficiency improvements 
outpace the rate at which emissions intensity targets tighten, then that 
emitter will have available a pool of surplus allowances, which it can 
sell to other emitters, relieving them of the need to reduce emissions.  
A facility that doubles production and meets a 20% greenhouse 
intensity reduction target can still emit 60% more than it had 
originally.220  There is thus no guarantee that the absolute amount of 
emissions will decrease.   
 
This is a potentially huge difference between the two forms of 
emissions trading that have been considered in the context of 
greenhouse gas regulation.  The simple cap and trade program would, 
depending on the number of special dispensations allowed, provide 
some degree of certainty in the absolute amount of aggregate 
greenhouse gas emissions, at least among those emitters covered by 
the program.  But because there is no way of foreseeing production 
efficiencies achieved in the future, there is no way to project how 
many allowances will be available in any given future year, and 
hence emissions that will be allowed.  Depending on their stringency, 
intensity-based programs may accomplish a little or a lot, but in any 
period of economic growth, will almost certainly be environmentally 
inferior to a similarly stringent cap-and-trade program.   
 
An intensity-based program is also economically inefficient 
for reasons having nothing to do with environmental effects.  The 
award of emissions allowances on the basis of productive output 
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amounts to a distortionary output subsidy.221  An output subsidy 
creates economic inefficiency by encouraging over-production, 
directing resources into production of the subsidized good that might 
be used for other valuable goods.  While every industry has an 
incentive to innovate to increase profit margins, an intensity-based 
program creates an extra incentive in the form of an extra source of 
wealth from productive efficiencies: the award of extra allowances.  
Apart from the environmental effects of this distortion, this creates a 
disadvantage for other industries. 
 
Given equal initial conditions, it is safe to say that intensity-
based emissions trading is both economically and environmentally 
inferior to cap-and-trade programs, although the false attraction of 
intensity-based programs is that it is less costly for regulated 
industries.  The last two federal governments have been reluctant to 
impose economic costs to reduce greenhouse gases, in light of the 
concern over the loss of business to the U.S., where there has been no 
prospect of federal greenhouse gas regulation at all.  However, with a 
new U.S. president, one that will be supporting legislation on climate 
change,222 this concern will surely become obsolete in the near future. 
 
C. Carbon Taxation vs. Cap-and-trade 
 
A more serious policy debate involves a comparison between 
a carbon cap-and-trade program and a carbon tax. From a policy 
perspective, cap-and-trade programs putatively create some certainty 
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about the quantity of emissions allowed, while taxation programs 
provide some certainty with respect to the price of emissions.  Some 
environmentalists have therefore called for a cap-and-trade program, 
on the reasoning that it is important to control the quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions rather than worry about the cost.223  
However, this is only a superficial reason to favour quantity controls 
over price controls; any quantity can be achieved by price 
mechanisms simply by setting the tax at an appropriate level.224  
 
Superficially, then, the two programs have similar economic 
effects: inducing emissions reductions where they can be most 
cheaply attained, leading to a minimization of the overall industry-
wide compliance costs.  However, there are a number of differences 
that separate the two types of programs.  We argue that the majority 
of differences favour a carbon tax program.  
 
1. Implementation Issues 
 
Most prominently, implementation problems have plagued 
cap-and-trade programs.  Designing a cap-and-trade program requires 
a determination of the level of the cap, which entities are subject to 
the program and above all, a determination of how the emissions 
allowances are to be initially allocated.  All of these are fraught with 
political peril.  Moreover, a cap-and-trade system can only apply to a 
reasonably manageable number of fairly large emitters – those that 
have the resources to monitor their emissions, and can buy and sell 
emissions allowances,225 and a small enough number that a regulatory 
agency could monitor their compliance.   
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The question of initial allocation has been a thorny one.  The 
traditional and most familiar answer is that allowances are given 
away for free, based on some historical baseline of emissions, as was 
done in the SO2 program.  The base calculation for what became a 
complicated formula was to grant emissions allowances to fossil fuel-
fired power plants equal to roughly half of the average emissions of 
the plant over a five-year period from 1980 to 1984.  But arriving at a 
rule such as this required extensive negotiations, and was a sobering 
exercise in rent-seeking.  Section 404(a)(3) provides that utilities in 
Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois would receive a special clump of 200,000 
allowances for the years 1995-1999, to be split in proportion to their 
baseline emissions.226  One would be hard-pressed to find a more 
naked example of raw political power.   
 
There is also the tendency for lawmaking bodies to over-
allocate allowances.  The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, or EU ETS, 
which took effect in 2005, has experienced several extreme price 
collapses, dipping to well below ten euros in several instances.227  
With carbon prices so low, and prices so volatile, investment in low-
carbon technologies has chilled,228 and emissions reductions 
stalled.229   
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One way around this initial allocation problem is to allocate 
allowances by auction.  Auctions do away with quarrels over 
historical baseline rules, and remove some of the temptation to soften 
the economic blow to industry.  Moreover, the mere allocation of 
emissions allowances for free to polluters produces an income effect 
that reduces incentives for innovation and for switching to cleaner 
fuels such as natural gas for electricity.230  Auctioning allowances 
also provides significant economic benefits in that the revenues could 
be recycled and used to reduce other taxes.231  The problem with 
auctioning allowances is one of political economy: distributing 
allowances for free does not require emitters to bear the cost of 
emissions.  And to the extent that allowances are given away for free 
by law, lawmakers writing cap-and-trade legislation are essentially 
printing money, for distribution to appreciative constituents.  Hence, 
the inevitable but inelegant marriages of rent-seekers and lawmakers. 
 
The fears and difficulties associated with designing a cap-and-
trade program are not imagined.  Carbon traders – advocates of cap-
and-trade who have an interest in a robust program – have already 
started publicly worrying that the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, a regional cap-and-trade program for eight Northeastern 
U.S. states,232 will be corrupted with special allocation rules and 
exceptions that will cumulatively defeat emissions reduction goals.233  
A group of business leaders and environmental organizations in the 
U.S. has been meeting privately to discuss what would be an 
acceptable compromise in terms of how to design a cap-and-trade 
program.  Focusing on the problem of how to allocate the emissions 
allowances, the group has failed, over two years, to arrive at a 
compromise.  In the words of Stanford professor David Victor, an 
observor, "[t]hey helped crystallize the concerns about climate 
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change … [b]ut the moment the coalition starts to focus on the 
details, it starts breaking apart."234   
 
By ignoring historical emissions entirely, a carbon tax avoids 
having to deal with the self-serving appeals to use one baseline rule 
or another.  A carbon tax is not free of political peril, but is harder to 
finagle.  By definition, a carbon tax would have to be applied to 
carbon-containing fuels meant for combustion.  Any carve-out from a 
universal rule would be conspicuously peculiar.  For example, 
trucking industries, which would be hard-hit by a carbon tax designed 
to reduce gasoline usage, could conceivably lobby for an exemption 
for diesel fuel, but how politically saleable would such a special 
dispensation be?  Would commuters paying more for gasoline tolerate 
such a dispensation?  And why not an exemption for the shipping 
industry?  What if the cement industry, which is very greenhouse gas-
intensive, lobbied for an exemption? Would that lead to an appeal 
from other vulnerable industries, such as pulp and paper production, 
or automobile manufacturing?  The slippery slope problems inherent 
in granting exemptions would, ironically, make it more difficult to do 
so.  By contrast, the ways that cap-and-trade allowances have been 
distributed are not at all necessarily obvious or free of controversy. 
 
Another specious but common feature of cap-and-trade 
proposals is the idea of "offsets," a way for emitters to generate 
additional allowances by undertaking projects that purport to reduce 
emissions by creating an emissions reduction from some baseline, or 
"business as usual" path.  For example, Canadian officials have from 
time to time floated ideas on granting emissions allowances for 
certain offset projects, such as forestry practices that result in longer 
rotations and more tree planting, on the theory that these enlightened 
practices sequester carbon dioxide, and serve to offset emissions 
elsewhere.235  The problem with such ideas is the inability of a 
certifying authority to ascertain whether the business as usual path is 
a genuine one or an ingeniously concocted story about whether some 
set of events would actually take place.  For example, a proposal to 
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generate offsets by lengthening rotations may or may not produce 
emissions reductions, as tree rotations may be extended for any 
number of economic, regulatory, or ecological reasons.  Granting 
credits under such circumstances is gratuitous, and frustrates 
emissions reduction objectives.   
 
The Kyoto Protocol has demonstrated the vulnerability of 
emissions trading to this form of rent-seeking.  "Clean Development 
Mechanisms," by which a developed country may finance a "low-
carbon" project in a developing country and in so doing collect 
credits towards meeting its Kyoto targets,236 have led to illusory 
emissions reductions.  Far from achieving any greenhouse gas 
reductions, the program has been mostly a political boondoggle, 
subsidizing projects in developing countries that are undertaken only 
because of the Clean Development Mechanism program.237  In 
retrospect, it should have been obvious that the Clean Development 
Mechanism concept was flawed in presuming that it could ascertain a 
"business as usual" baseline and reward projects that create a 
downward deviation from such a baseline.  Any emissions trading 
program that permits credits based on any business-as-usual 
projections invites ingeniously misleading arguments for extraneous 
projects. 
 
Carbon taxation is not completely free of political peril or 
rent-seeking, either.  Setting the level of the tax is the politically 
sensitive decision that must be made in implementing a carbon tax.  
Economics professors Jack Mintz and Nancy Olewiler have proposed 
taking the current federal fuel excise tax, which only applies to 
transportation fuels, and applying it across the board to all carbon-
containing energy sources, including coal, natural gas, fuel oil, and 
other gases and liquids sold for combustion,238 a proposal that seems 
to have been recently adopted by the federal Liberal Party.239  The 
advantage of this proposal is that it would not require an increase in 
gasoline taxes, which is always a politically sensitive move. The 
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disadvantage of this proposal is the fact that it will not curb emissions 
from motor vehicles at all, because it merely seeks to extend the same 
tax already levied on motor fuels to other fossil fuels.  It is hard to 
believe that Canada can sufficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
without reducing emissions from the transportation sector, which 
accounts for about 26 percent of Canada's greenhouse gas 
emissions.240  Reducing emissions from transportation would require 
an increase in fuel costs.  There is, of course, a simple remedy for 
this: increase the tax across the board, for all fossil fuels destined for 
combustion.   
 
Cap-and-trade programs can only succeed if the cap is a tight, 
binding constraint, and if leakage is tightly controlled, covering as 
many sectors as possible.  The EU, with its stated good intentions, has 
evidently not yet succeeded in this regard.  Cap-and-trade programs 
thus have great potential for achieving greenhouse gas reductions, but 
the short history of such programs does not bode particularly well for 
cap-and-trade as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
Lawmaking bodies all over the world, domestic and international, 
have simply been unable to contain the impulse to create loose caps 
and allow emissions leakage, frustrating emissions reductions 
objectives.  The carbon tax has at least one important advantage: 
there is one obvious methodology for setting a carbon tax, and that is 
to base the tax on the carbon content of a fossil fuel.  This criterion is 
so obvious and so straightforward, and is so conveniently 
proportional to the harm caused by greenhouse gas emissions, that it 
would be more difficult to tamper with it politically than it would be 
to simply impose it. 
 
2. Political and Psychological Issues 
 
Perhaps the more salient question is how politically 
acceptable a carbon tax would be.  The political reality that haunts 
Canada is that the very mention of the word "tax" in the same 
sentence as "carbon" evokes emotional reactions in Alberta.  While 
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the word "tax" is always loaded in North America generally,241 in 
Alberta the word stirs up resentment stemming from the Lougheed-
Trudeau clash in the 1980s.242  So hostile are Albertans (and North 
Americans generally) to the word tax that even policies that 
substantively address the basis of these fears are dismissed.  A 
greenhouse gas tax plan proposed by Michael Ignatieff during his 
2006 campaign for leadership of the Liberal Party lived a very short 
political life.  Ignatieff's proposal would have funneled carbon tax 
revenues back to the province in which they were collected.243  Little 
good it did: political columnist Jeffrey Simpson joked that Ignatieff's 
move was the political equivalent of affixing a "Kick Me" sign on his 
back.244   
 
Is the carbon tax really a political third rail?  Does it in fact 
bring up old ghosts of the NEP?  With prominent oil sands interests 
starting to come out in favour of a carbon tax,245 it is apparent that 
cracks in the Albertan anti-tax edifice are beginning to appear.  The 
economics and the politics of carbon taxation have also changed.  
With the price of crude topping $145 per barrel for the first time in 
history,246 the prospect of a carbon tax is no longer enough to send 
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shudders up and down Albertan spines.247  Rather, the politics of 
carbon taxation may be more aligned with the vulnerability of 
industries to the input price pressures presented by a carbon tax.  The 
modest B.C. carbon tax has drawn objections from the mining, 
cement, forestry and smelting industries, trade-intensive industries 
with a limited ability to pass the tax on to their consumers.248  
Ontario, with a number of energy-intensive industries, including the 
vulnerable automotive industry, has not been friendly territory for 
carbon tax proposals.249 
 
Moreover, the carbon tax meets with political resistance on 
the ground that as a consumption tax, it is thought to be regressive.250  
Gasoline taxes, for example, impose higher transportation costs that 
take up a larger proportion of a poor driver's paycheck than that of a 
rich driver, so the thinking goes, such that an increase would deprive 
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Institute, Oil Sands Fever – the Environmental Implications of Canada's Oil Sands 
Rush, 2004 (2006)), so that a $50/tonne carbon tax would add another $3.80 per 
barrel.  
 
248
 Nathan Vanderklippe, BC industry lines up against carbon tax, Canwest 
News, May 27, 2008, online at 
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=5e7547ab-0554-4f89-86e3-
698e6df5f12b.  
 
249
  Maria Babbage, McGuinty at odds with Dion over carbon tax, Canadian 
Press, May 27, 2008, online at Thestar.com, 
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/431833.  Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty 
has opposed federal Liberal carbon tax proposals, notwithstanding his brother being 
the federal Liberal environment critic that is advancing the idea of a federal carbon 
tax. 
 
250
 Sarah E. West and Roberton C. Williams, Estimates from a Consumer 
Demand System: Implications from the Incidence of Environmental Taxes, 47 J. 
EVNTL. ECON. & MGMT. 535, 535 (2004) ("Most studies suggest that environmental 
taxes are regressive, making them less attractive policy options."); Shi-Ling Hsu, 
Carbon Tax Heuristics and Politics: the Case of the Gasoline Tax (April 15, 2008) 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121039.   
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poorer drivers of more basic goods than rich drivers.251  This line of 
thinking, however, seems to be based more on selective anecdote than 
empirical analysis.252  Moreover, the question of whether a carbon tax 
is regressive or not is more complicated than is typically presented in 
public discussion.  Is a carbon tax regressive if the lowest quintile of 
households is hurt more than the second-lowest quintile, but the 
second-lowest quintile is hurt less than the richest quintile?  How 
many income classifications are needed for analysis?  Is elasticity to 
be taken into account?253  Do we think about regressiveness in terms 
                                                 
 
251
  James M. Poterba, Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive? NBER Working Paper 
No. 3578, online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3578.pdf; republished in TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 5 145-164 (D. Bradford, ed., 1991); Chris 
Harrison, Regressive Taxation Rage, Democraticunderground.com, March 1, 2002, 
online at http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/02/03/01_regressive.html 
("Perhaps an even better example for the innate unfairness of regressive taxation is 
a gasoline tax. While well-intentioned advocates of a gasoline tax tout the way it 
will shift demand away from gas-guzzling SUV's and toward hybrid cars and public 
transit, they fail to recognize how it will devastate large groups of lower-income 
commuters…. Many of the rural poor already spend a large percentage of their 
income on commuting to and from work. If a sizable gasoline tax were to be 
enacted, without the public transportation infrastructure already in place, many of 
these lower-wage earners would be left to choose between gas for commuting to 
work, or food on the table. If they choose to immediately feed their families, they 
could be left without sufficient funds for gas, in which case they could lose their 
jobs due to their inability to get to work."). 
 
252
 The New York Times ran a series of articles on the impact of high 
gasoline prices on various individuals throughout the country, highlighting the 
hardships imposed upon cabdrivers ("'Compared to a year ago, I pay $15 more a 
day in gas,' said Miguel Gonzalez, 67, of Queens. 'I only take home $100 a day, so 
that's my lunch and dinner right there.'"), immigrants ("Lesly Richardson, 50, a 
Haitian immigrant from Brooklyn, nodded in agreement. 'That's $100 a week,' he 
said. 'That's your grocery bill.'"), college students ("Mr. Cole, who studies 
computers at Lakeland Community College and earns $8.18 an hour working in a 
factory that heat-treats metal, did not have money for gas. So he stayed home.  'I 
won't be able to see her [his girlfriend] till I get paid,' he said. 'Ever since gas prices 
went up, it's like I'm barely able to see her.'"), single mothers ("In an adjoining gas 
lane, Cindy Wright spoke of the pain high gas prices cause the single mothers who 
make up many of the clients at the public health clinic in Torrington, where she is a 
nurse.").  As Gas Prices Go Up, Impact Trickles Down, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2006, 
at A1. 
 
253
  Regressivity could be measured by different delineations of income, and 
using a large variety of different assumptions about how drivers respond.  The most 
careful study of the projected incidence of a gas tax increase was done by West and 
Williams, who estimated separate demand models for each of five income quintiles, 
one- and two-adult households, and found that under the most severe and simplistic 
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of a present snapshot in time, or do we think about the lifetime 
income or consumption of individuals?254  It is simplistic to flatly 
pronounce, as NDP leader Jack Layton has, that a carbon tax would 
"hurt the poor."255 
 
3. Revenue Recycling 
 
In order to blunt the various kinds of political opposition, 
there is often talk about how carbon taxes raise revenues,256 and how 
these revenues might be "recycled" or "shifted" in such a way as to 
reduce the economic pain of those having to pay the tax, or to 
redistribute income to the poor.  As economists generally consider 
income and sales taxes to be distortionary,257 proposals to reduce 
environmental harm by taxation has the potential bonus of reducing 
distortionary taxes and increasing social welfare.258  Or it could even 
                                                                                                                 
assumptions – that gasoline is perfectly inelastic and people make no adjustments 
whatsoever to changes in the price of gasoline – the incidence on the poorest 
quintiles is not substantially different from that of the next two higher quintiles.  
Sarah E. West and Roberton C. Williams, Estimates from a Consumer Demand 
System: Implications from the Incidence of Environmental Taxes, 47 J. EVNTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 535, 551 (Table 3) (2004).  See also, James M. Poterba, Is the 
Gasoline Tax Regressive? in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 145-160 (D. 
Bradford, ed., 1991).  
 
254
 Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur, & Gilbert Metcalf, The Incidence of a 
U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 13554 (2007) (on file with author). 
 
255
  Joanna Smith, Carbon tax would hurt the poor, NDP says, Thestar.com, 
May 23, 2008, online at http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/429174.  
 
256
 It should be noted that if emissions allowances are auctioned, cap-and-
trade programs can also raise revenues.  This is discussed infra, notes -230 and text 
accompanying. 
 
257
  See, e.g., Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian Parry, Roberton Williams III & Dallas 
Burtraw, The Cost-effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental 
Protection in a Second-best Setting, 72 J. PUBL. ECON. 329 (1999); Ian Parry, 
Roberton C. Williams III & Lawrence Goulder, When can Carbon Abatement 
Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 
J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 52 (1999); Ian Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis 
in the Presence of Distorting Taxes, 19 J. Policy Analysis & Mgmt. 603 (2000). 
 
258
 This economic effect, popularly known as the "double dividend," is the 
subject of debate.  It has been argued that environmental taxes increase the cost of 
goods, such that reducing distortionary income taxes may not offset the excess 
burden of the environmental tax. Lawrence H. Goulder, Effects of Carbon Taxes in 
an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium 
Analysis. 29 J. ENV’T. ECON.& MGMT. 271 (1995). However, it has also been 
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be recycled back to emitters forced to pay the tax, as Sweden has 
done with a tax on emissions of nitrogen oxides.259  These revenue 
recycling ideas often serve to dull the political sharp edges that 
confront taxation proposals. 
 
An important point to bear in mind, however, is that the point 
of a carbon tax would be to decrease consumption of carbon-emitting 
activities, so that the tax proceeds would eventually decline.  If (and 
hopefully when) carbon-emitters respond to the tax by reducing 
carbon emissions, tax proceeds would also decline.  Some account 
would need to be taken, then, of future sources of tax proceeds to 
replace the declining stream of carbon tax proceeds.  The carbon tax 
should not be oversold, then, as both an effective way to reduce 
emissions and also an economically painless way to do so.  What 
carbon tax proceeds could accomplish is provide some temporary aid 
for various transitional costs associated with making the kinds of 
structural societal changes required to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
 
4. Carbon Taxation vs. Cap-and-trade – Conclusion  
 
In environmental instrument choice, pollution taxation has 
played the role of "bad cop" to cap-and-trade's "good cop," because 
taxation always appears to be more costly than cap-and-trade 
programs.  The obvious but obscured reality is, however, that 
environmental progress will always cost, and the question is who 
bears the costs, not whether they are borne at all.  The economic 
virtue and political downfall of taxation programs is that they 
generally present the costs in an open and transparent fashion, while 
cap-and-trade programs, if implemented by issuing free, 
"grandfathered" allowances, hide them.  As noted in the comparison 
of grandfathered allowances with auctioned allowances, 
                                                                                                                 
argued that this fails to account for the fact that the income tax system, by allowing 
deductions, creates distortions by favoring certain kinds of spending; thus if 
environmental taxes can reduce income taxes, it can also reduce these distortions. 
Ian W. H. Parry & Antonio M. Bento, Tax Deductions, Environmental Policy, and 
the "Double Dividend" Hypothesis, 39 J. ENV’T. ECON. & MGMT. 67 (2000). 
 
259
 The NOx tax in Sweden is levied upon energy producers but rebated to 
them in proportion to energy output.  The Swedish Charge on Nitrous Oxides, at 
http://www.internat.naturvardsverket.se/ (June 1, 2007).  This would, however, 
convert the tax into a distortionary output subsidy.  Supra, note 221. 
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grandfathering allowances seems to cost nothing, but in reality, 
represents a deadweight economic loss, as well a loss of auction 
proceeds that could be used for any number of governmental 
purposes, including the reduction of other taxes. 
 
The word "tax" itself is partially responsible for its 
unpopularity, a somewhat uniquely North America pathology.260  One 
experiment found that people were more positively inclined towards a 
program requiring a "payment" than one that involved a "tax," even if 
the programs were substantively identical.261  But this is the framing 
problem confronting any advocate of any tax program: people tend to 
favour programs that hide costs, rather than make them transparent.  
For example, opposition to gasoline taxes to reduce gasoline usage is 
replaced in the U.S. by vehicle fleet fuel efficiency standards, or 
CAFE standards, which are less effective in reducing fuel usage but 
do hide the costs of conservation in vehicle design and upfront 
pricing.262  From a purely economic point of view, phobic reactions to 
any policy with the word "tax" in it are irrational, since any 
alternative to taxes simply hides the costs from public view or 
cognizance.   
 
Recent public opinion polls seem to suggest that the Canadian 
public is ahead of Canadian politicians, at least federal ones, on 
addressing climate change through carbon taxation.263  If this trend 
continues, then the pocketbook pandering by Canadian politicians is 
surely a political miscalculation.  Among economists, there is a 
growing consensus that a carbon tax is a superior means of addressing 
                                                 
 
260
 Hsu, supra, note 250, at 250. 
 
261
 Edward J. McCaffrey and Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of 
Redistribution, CLEO Research Paper Series, Research Paper CO5-4 (2005), 
available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=695305.  
 
262
  Shi-Ling Hsu, supra, note 250.  
 
263
 Poll results vary, but a growing number of polls seem to indicate 
robustness with respect to Canadian support for a carbon tax.  One recent poll 
showed that 61% of Canadians supported "a carbon tax levied on people and 
business based on the carbon emissions they generate," with 32% opposed.  Even 
Albertans responded favourably by a margin of 65 to 33%.  Harris/Decima, Press 
Release: Tax Environmental Harm, Reward Environmental Good, May 7, 2008, 
available online at http://www.harrisdecima.ca/en/pdf/news_releases/080508E.pdf. 
See also, Mike DeSouza, Carbon Tax Gaining Support Across Canada: Poll, 
Canwest News Services, May 25, 2008 (on file with author). 
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greenhouse gas emissions,264 and along with it, a sense that public 
opinion may soon follow.  While the manufacturing-heavy regions of 
Southern Ontario will balk, the obvious benefits of carbon taxation 
will ultimately prevail, especially if some transitional relief can be 
provided. 
 
We believe that a carbon tax is clearly the most economically 
and environmentally effective option available to the federal 
government.  The implementation advantages of administering what 
is essentially another sales tax over the regulatory infrastructure that 
would be needed to design and administer a cap-and-trade program, 
are too compelling even for cravenly political animals to ignore.  
While political shenanigans have saddled cap-and-trade programs 
with special allocation perks that frustrate emissions reduction 
objectives, a federal carbon tax would be more difficult to sabotage.  
Because a federal carbon tax would typically be levied on a 
transaction like a sales tax, it would require a bit more audacity to 
write into legislation some blatant giveaway that would serve to 
insulate or exempt certain industries or individuals.  Taxes are by 
their nature more universal, so that they come with a presumption that 
everyone pays them.   
 
D. Command and control regulation 
 
Because greenhouse gases are a by-product of such a wide 
variety of activities, a regulation of the command-and-control type 
would necessarily be extremely complex, might take one of many 
different forms, and draw on a wide variety of technologies.  For coal 
combustion, industry standards might refer to carbon capture and 
                                                 
 
264
  Economists Favor Fossil Fuels Tax to Spur Alternatives – Survey, E&E 
NEWS PM, Feb. 8, 2007.  Nobel Laureate Economist Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief 
economic advisor to President Bill Clinton, called for a global carbon tax in 2006, 
(Joseph Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, 3 Economists' Voice Issue 7, 
Article 3 (2006), online at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context=ev), as did 
Harvard Economics Professor Gregory Mankiw, a former chief economic advisor to 
President George W. Bush (Gregory Mankiw, Raise the Gasoline Tax, WALL ST. 
JOURNAL, October 20, 2006, online at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116131055641498552.html, republished on 
Gregory Mankiw's blog, at http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/10/pigou-club-
manifesto.html).  
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storage technology, or coal gasification,265 or any number of 
technologies and processes that have come along in the drive to save 
coal combustion from obsolescence in a carbon-constrained world.  
For natural gas exploration, command-and-control regulation might 
mandate techniques to limit flaring, the wasteful initial burning off of 
natural gas before the gas stream can be harnessed.  For other 
combustion and industrial processes, a variety of other technologies 
and techniques may be possible.  Command-and-control regulation in 
the context of greenhouse gas regulation would thus be a mandate to 
install some emissions reduction technology or adopt some 
emissions-reducing practices, most likely ones that are ascertained by 
looking at industry practices, or perhaps common industry ideas.  It 
would be impossible to cover all Canadian greenhouse gas emitters, 
as there are literally thousands of smaller emitters that are too 
numerous to identify and regulate.   
 
That said, a small number of credible voices have called for 
command-and-control type regulation of greenhouse gases, simply 
because immediate and dramatic governmental action is required.  
Scientific studies reporting increasingly dire forecasts for climate 
change are now strongly suggesting that humankind has a very small 
amount of time before some catastrophic climate events take place, 
such as the melting of ice sheets in both Greenland and Antarctica 
that would add a catastrophic 25 metres to sea level.266  Scientists 
believe that a sustained increase of 2° C over pre-industrial levels 
would lead to the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which would 
itself add 7 metres to sea level,267 a troublesome prospect since we 
                                                 
 
265
  Carbon capture and storage typically involve separating carbon dioxide 
from other gases in process emissions, compressing it to a high density, and then 
storing it underground or beneath the ocean to isolate it from the atmosphere. 
International Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Special Report on Carbon dioxide 
Capture and Storage, Technical Summary, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-
reports/srccs/srccs_technicalsummary.pdf.   
  Coal gasification technology turns solid coal into gas before burning it. 
This allows impurities to be removed from the fuel more efficiently and effectively 
than in conventional coal-burning plants, where the clean-up is done post-
combustion. Jennie C. Stephens, “Coupling CO2 Capture and Storage with Coal 
Gasification: Defining “Sequestration-Ready” IGCC”, 
http://www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/energy.   
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 ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 117 (2d ed., 
2008). 
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 HENSON, supra, note 266, at 87-88. 
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have already experienced a rise of 0.7° C.268  An even scarier 
prospect is the melting of Antarctic ice sheets, which would, with the 
melting of the Greenland ice sheets lead to a truly catastrophic 25 
metre rise in sea levels, and even that could occur with as little as a 3° 
C increase in temperature from pre-industrial levels.269  
 
From a policy perspective, there may be considerable 
advantage in a blunt but broad instrument, one that might achieve 
some deep reductions very soon, even if it comes at a high 
compliance cost.  While the economics might theoretically favour 
cap-and-trade or carbon taxation programs, the practicalities and 
politics of such programs may cause a delay that humankind may not 
be able to afford.  The advantage of the traditional command-and-
control type of regulation is that regulatory infrastructures are already 
in place, and administrative agencies in developed countries such as 
Canada know how to carry them out.  With the kinds of market 
signals that politicians are currently talking about and implementing –
a modest $40 per tonne in the case of the Liberal Party proposal for a 
federal carbon tax – the large-scale structural and cultural changes 
may not take place in time.270  While a price on carbon is a necessary 
condition to greenhouse gas reduction, it may not be a sufficient 
one.271 
 
Against this backdrop, prominent economists such as Jeffrey 
Sachs, the director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, 
argue for large-scale governmental intervention into the many 
technological possibilities that could make a major and near-term 
difference in reducing greenhouse gases.  For example, carbon 
capture and storage technology, which would capture carbon dioxide 
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 HENSON, supra, note 266, at 3. 
 
269
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration scientist and climate 
change pioneer James Hansen believes that a sustained increase of 3° C could lead 
to positive feedback effects that would trigger the truly catastrophic melting of 
Antarctic ice sheets.  James E. Hansen, Scientific Reticence and Sea Level Rise, 2:1, 
4-5 (2007).  Among most credible scientists, Hansen's predictions are considered 
slightly aggressive but highly credible.  See, e.g., ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH 
GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 116-18 (2d ed., 2008). 
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 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Technological Keys to Climate Protection, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, March 18, 2008, online at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=keys-
to-climate-protection.  
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at its point of emission and pipe and store it underground without 
allowing its escape into the atmosphere,272 would require a substantial 
amount of government-sponsored research, the construction of 
pipelines that cross property boundaries and jurisdictions, and the 
monitoring of storage facilities to ensure that the carbon dioxide 
actually stays underground.273  Development and maturation of this 
technology is not possible without substantial governmental 
involvement.  Along similar lines, Scott Barrett argued in a 2003 
book, Environment and Statecraft, that climate technologies need 
such widespread and rapid deployment that uniformity of technology 
is required to coordinate their worldwide adoption.274  In light of the 
difficulty of inducing developing countries to undertake emissions 
reductions, the agreement upon a single way of doing things may 
facilitate a fairly large-scale change in relatively short order.   
 
All of these considerations that favour a command-and-
control response are global in nature, and only implicate Canada as 
one of many developed countries that could lead by example.  Along 
with the United States, however, Canada has some uniquely 
favourable conditions for undertaking large, government-supported 
projects that could produce global command-and-control strategies: a 
huge (too huge) infrastructure for the mining, transport, and 
combustion of coal; a vast network (not vast enough) of pipelines that 
could be utilized for carbon dioxide transport; and oil and gas 
exploration ventures that might benefit from carbon dioxide as a 
means of "enhanced recovery," using carbon dioxide as a gaseous 
pump to extract more oil or gas.275  One pilot project involves the 
piping of carbon dioxide captured from a plant in North Dakota to an 
oil field in Saskatchewan that will increase production from the oil 
field.276  While private efforts such as these are encouraging, the 
widespread and rapid adoption of these efforts will require 
considerable governmental involvement.   
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 International Panel on Climate Change, supra, note 265, at 19, 21, 23, 36-
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 CO2 Capture and Storage, Weyburn Enhanced Oil Recover Project, 
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In this regard, a saving grace of the current federal greenhouse 
gas plan – the centerpiece of which is a fishy intensity-based 
emissions trading plan – is the requirement that all oil and gas 
facilities coming online after 2012 install carbon capture and storage 
technology.277  Similarly, many European policymakers are at least 
preparing for investment in carbon capture and storage technology as 
a part of their greenhouse gas reduction efforts, requiring all coal-
fired power plants constructed after 2020 to include the 
technology.278  One would hope, by that time, there would be very 
few, if any coal-fired power plants being constructed.  However, the 
acknowledgement, through a command-and-control mandate, of the 
need to require widespread utilization of a greenhouse gas reduction 
technology, is surely a step in the right direction. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Both constitutional and policy considerations favour two 
instruments for reducing Canadian greenhouse gases: a carbon tax 
and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.  Both federal and 
provincial authorities to impose a carbon tax are clear.  Federal 
authority to consider greenhouse gases under the CEA Act is also 
quite solid.  A constitutional and political virtue of both the carbon 
tax and the environmental assessment process is the fact that both 
instruments leave provincial initiatives alone.  Under taxation 
schemes, both federal and provincial governments are free to 
establish and pursue their greenhouse gas objectives without 
interference from the other.  A comprehensive federal cap-and-trade 
system may survive constitutional scrutiny but raise issues about how 
it would mesh with provincial trading programs. The greenhouse gas 
intensity-based system currently pursued by the federal government 
poses both constitutional and policy problems. Command-and-control 
regulation would, like a cap-and-trade program, likely survive 
constitutional scrutiny but raise implementation issues. Given the 
increased interest on the part of both the Alberta government and the 
federal government in carbon capture and storage, there is an 
enormous potential for conflict over who will be required to capture 
carbon, and who will store it, and where.  That two levels of 
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 Europeans are Preparing to Bet Heavily on Carbon, Climatewire, April 4, 
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government should be independently pursuing separate programs that 
require a great deal of coordination is folly. 
 
The policy advantages of a carbon tax and the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act are quite strong.  Both draw on 
existing regulatory infrastructures.  In the case of the carbon tax, little 
additional monitoring and enforcement capability is required, as 
taxation at a transaction point is something that revenue agencies 
throughout Canada already do quite effectively.  And while the 
existing CEA Act currently does a poor job of handling greenhouse 
gas considerations, relatively simple amendments by regulation or 
legislation would suffice to patch its shortcomings.  By contrast, there 
are some fairly serious policy issues that need to be dealt with before 
either a federal cap-and-trade or command-and-control system were 
to be put in place, and more still with intensity-based emissions 
trading. 
 
The politics of greenhouse gas regulation are changing 
rapidly, more quickly than federal politicians are realizing.  The 
familiar old economic doomsayers have lost credibility, and with 
even oil sands interests coming out in favour of a carbon tax,279 it 
appears that Canadians are more willing to absorb economic pain 
than federal politicians, in their obsequious pandering, have expected.  
Sometimes the simplest of solutions are the most elusive to grasp.  
Canadians and the world would greatly benefit if federal politicians 
could summon up the modest courage and foresight to implement a 
sensible greenhouse gas reduction strategy taking advantage of these 
two policy instruments. 
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